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This dissertation consists of three chapters that study the effects of government assis-
tance on household behavior and welfare. The first chapter studies the effect of the Housing
Voucher Program (Section 8) on household behavior and welfare. Policymakers and re-
searchers continuously debate the optimal structure and scope of the U.S. Housing Voucher
Program. The current program features an inverse relation between subsidies and recipients’
income, a high degree of rationing, and a limited scope of voucher usage. This chapter studies
the effect of the Housing Voucher Program on low-income household behavior and welfare.
Using several household datasets, I specify and estimate a lifecycle model that characterizes
the effects of housing vouchers. Then I examine how a set of policy reforms affect household
labor supply, marriage, homeownership, and well-being.
The second chapter investigates the role of job mismatch, wage dispersion, student debt,
family background, and preferences in accounting for the rise in parental coresidence rates
over time. Parental coresidence rates for college graduates have risen substantially over the
last twenty five years, from 25% average coresidence rate for 23-27 yo for 1996 graduation co-
hort to over 31% for the 2014 graduation cohort. We develop a structurally estimated model
of child-parent decisions to study the quantitative effect of job mismatch, wage dispersion,
student debt, family background, and preferences on coresidence rates.
The third chapter examines the effect student debt on marriage and homeownership
among college graduates. Student debt for the current college cohort has increased in terms
of number of debtors and average amount, which subsequently impacts family formation and
homeownership. Using NLSY 79 and NLSY 97 data, we develop and estimate a lifecycle
model to quantify the role of student debt in college graduates’ marriage and homeownership
patterns. Beyond student debt, we also examine the role of housing prices, wage dispersion,
and downpayment rates in accounting for the difference in homeownership and marriage.
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1.0 Housing Vouchers, Labor Supply and Household Formation: A Structural
Approach
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8) is the largest federal program
offering rental assistance in the private housing market. Between 1998 and 2018, government
expenditure on the program increased from $10.5 billion to $21 billion. According to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the number of recipient households
rose from 1.4 million to 2.5 million. The program has undergone no major reforms since its
implementation, and the optimal structure and scope of the program remain open to debate
(Olsen, 2003; Collinson et al., 2015, 2019). The program’s effects on household behavior and
well-being are critical to the evaluation of its current application and alternative designs.
This paper studies the effects of the current housing voucher program and its alternatives
on low-income household behavior and welfare.
This paper contributes to our understanding of how changes in subsidy structure, degree
of rationing, and voucher usage options influence household decisions and well-being. Though
policymakers and researchers continue to debate potential policy reforms, no study has
evaluated the effects of the reforms that have been discussed on household behavior and
welfare (Husock, 2004; King, 2015; Yglesias, 2020). Most research adopts a reduced form
approach to estimate the current program’s effects. In contrast, I apply a structural analysis
to evaluate the proposed reforms that aim to improve the program’s implementation.
In particular, I study three possible changes to the current program and how they would
affect household decisions and welfare. First, the current program features an inverse rela-
tionship between subsidies and recipients’ income, which has the effect of discouraging labor
supply (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012). To mitigate the current program’s work disincentives, I
consider a proposed policy that removes the inverse relation between subsidy and income,
whereby every recipient household receives the same amount of subsidy. Second, the current
program features a high degree of rationing and no time limit on receiving benefits, which
1
offers continuous subsidies to only a small fraction of eligible households. Researchers argue
that rationing in housing assistance programs may lead to resource misallocation and welfare
loss (Olsen, 2003; Collinson et al., 2015, 2019). I simulate two policy proposals that intend
to expand the scope of households assisted by the program: one provides lower benefits to
more households and the other offers time-limited subsidies. Third, current housing vouchers
can only be used for renting. Olsen et al. (2007) argue that the housing voucher program
is biased against homeownership because the subsidy decreases the relative cost of renting
versus homeownership. I explore the effect of a policy that allows households to buy homes
with their vouchers. For all the policy reforms, I consider the program’s effects not only on
labor supply and homeownership but also on marriage as vouchers may alter the insurance
value of marriage and impact marriage dynamics (Moffitt, 1998; Mills et al., 2006). Finally,
to shed light on the general equilibrium effect, I apply a separate framework developed by
Zhang (2020) to study the role of housing assistance on rental and housing prices and apply
it to each policy experiment. The ability to evaluate these policies and household behavior
in a coherent and unified framework is one of the main advantages of my paper.
Beyond the contribution to evaluating major program reforms, this paper also contributes
to our understanding of the program’s effect on multiple fronts. First, this paper contributes
to the understanding of in-kind transfers such as housing vouchers on household behavior and
welfare. I explicitly model housing subsidies as an in-kind transfer by incorporating both
goods and housing consumption, where housing vouchers subsidize housing consumption.
Second, in my model, households choose whether to participate in the voucher program,
and the data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) allows me to estimate the key
parameter that governs household participation in the program. Other studies have to
assume participation due to data limitations (Keane and Moffitt, 1998). Third, evidence of
the effects of housing vouchers on family formation and homeownership is still inadequate.
Most of that limited evidence is descriptive rather than causal (Olsen et al., 2007; Carasso
et al., 2005). I explore the causal impact of the program on marriage and homeownership.
Finally, whereas existing literature either employs local samples or explores the short-term
effects (Heintze et al., 2006; Painter, 2001; Jacob and Ludwig, 2012), I study the program
nationally and explores its long-term effects.
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I establish stylized facts about the housing voucher program, which shows that vouchers
are associated with lower employment, marriage and homeownership. Motivated by these
stylized facts, I specify and estimate a structural lifecycle model to understand the mech-
anisms underlying the current program’s effects on household behavior and welfare. My
model captures the features of the program as well as household decisions on labor supply,
marriage, and homeownership. I model both goods and housing consumption, where vouch-
ers only subsidize housing consumption. Since participation in the program is self-selective,
I endogenously model program participation. Conditional on program participation, house-
holds receive a voucher with a certain probability. Along with the decision to participate in
the program, households choose whether to work, to marry, to buy a home, and how much
to save.
To estimate my model, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and the American Housing Survey (AHS). Most of the information on households eli-
gible for vouchers is in the SIPP. The information on household participation in the program
is in the AHS. I show that the model matches the targeted moments, such as household
labor supply, marriage, homeownership, and participation in the voucher program. The
model also replicates salient features of untargeted moments and empirical estimates from
existing literature. I then explore the behavioral response and welfare implications of several
program reforms. The first reform offers the same amount of subsidy to voucher recipient
households, regardless of household income. The second experiment preserves the negative
relation between subsidy amount and income and provides modest subsidies to all eligible
households that apply for vouchers. The third policy introduces time-limited subsides, i.e.,
5-year subsidies. My final experiment gives households the option to buy a home with their
vouchers.
The effects on the behavior of low-income households across my four experiments differ,
though the government budget is neutral in all cases. In the first one, where every recipient
household receives the same amount of subsidy, households will work more. The flat subsidy
overcomes the disincentives generated by the current program towards labor supply to some
extent. In particular, this policy increases single men’s labor supply by 2 percentage points
(3 percent relative to the mean) and single women’s labor supply by 2 percentage points (4
3
percent relative to the mean). However, this policy has no significant impact on marriage
and homeownership. The second policy experiment provides modest subsidies to all eligible
applicants, where the subsidy amount is inversely related to household income. As a result,
household labor supply decreases as the negative effect on labor supply spreads out over
more households. This program change, with its negative effect, also decreases marriage
and homeownership by changing the attractiveness of outside options to marriage and the
relative cost of homeownership. The third experiment, in which vouchers only last 5 years,
has a much smaller negative effect on labor supply, marriage, and homeownership. Fourth,
the homeownership rate among eligible households rises by 4 percentage points (16 percent
relative to the mean) when households are given the option to use the vouchers to buy homes.
It also promotes marriage by 1.5 percentage points (3 percent relative to the mean) as the
increase in homeownership makes marriage more attractive. However, this policy has no
impact on household labor supply.
I also evaluate the effect of the policy reforms on household welfare. Compared to the
current program, the policy that provides the same amount of subsidy to every recipient
household reduces overall welfare among eligible households. In the current program, each
recipient household receives a subsidy inversely related to household income. However, ac-
cording to the policy, each recipient household receives the same amount so that relatively
low-income households lose some benefits, while relatively high-income households gain some
benefits. Since relatively-low income households have a higher marginal utility from a sub-
sidy, the welfare loss for low-income households dominates the welfare gain from high-income
households, yielding an overall reduction in welfare. The policy that provides lower benefits
to all eligible households that apply for vouchers improves welfare because it assists more
needy families who have a greater marginal utility at the lower benefit level. Introducing
time limits also increases overall welfare by attenuating the rationing problem of the pro-
gram. The policy that offers households the option to use vouchers to buy homes makes
households better off as it promotes homeownership and homeownership is associated with
higher utility flow. When considering general equilibrium effects, the effect of each policy on
housing and rental prices is limited, assuming that the elasticity of housing supply is at the
national median level. This implies that the main results are robust to general equilibrium
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effects of housing vouchers.
In the robustness analysis, I provide more perspective into the program design by exper-
imenting with various degrees of program targeting and transferring in-kind versus transfer-
ring in cash. In addition, I discuss the evidence of the housing voucher program’s effect on
rental prices. I also show that the results are robust when relaxing several model assumptions
and incorporating moving costs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the background of the
Housing Voucher Program; Section III describes the data sets and stylized facts; Section
IV describes the lifecycle model and discusses the agent’s problem; Section V discusses the
identification strategy, the structural parameter estimates as well as the internal and external
fit of the model along several key dimensions; Section VI presents the policy experiments
and reports on the effects on household behavior and welfare of potential program reforms;
Section VII experiments with a variety of program targeted populations and shows the
robustness of the results to alternative assumptions. The last section concludes this paper.
1.2 The Housing Voucher Program
In this section, I provide a brief review of the Housing Voucher Program (Section 8).
The national shortage of affordable housing for low-income households is more than 7.2
million in 2018 (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2018). The housing problem is
not simply an inadequate supply of housing for low-income Americans to live in, however,
but also extraordinarily high housing costs and undesirable living conditions. For example,
an estimated 12 million households pay more than 50% of their annual incomes for housing,
and most low-income households live in neighborhoods with high poverty rates, unsanitary
conditions, and fewer employment opportunities (HUD, 2019).
To tackle such problems, the federal government administers affordable housing programs
targeting low-income households to improve their housing conditions. The most important
is the Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8), which started in the 1980s to assist low-
income families to rent in private markets. Figure 1 illustrates shows that low-income housing
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subsidies have more than quadrupled since 1980, while outlays for other cash assistance
programs have remained constant. The increase has coincided with a change in housing policy
from supply-side to demand-side housing subsidies, i.e., the introduction of the Certificate
Program in the 1970s and the Section 8 Voucher Program in the 1980s. The Section 8 Voucher
Program and the Certificate Program were consolidated into one program in 1998, which is
today’s Section 8 Housing Voucher Program (Olsen, 2003). The housing voucher program
has grown rapidly during the past 20 years, both in terms of the number of households
assisted and the amount of subsidy per household (Figure 2).
Housing vouchers are administered locally by public housing agencies (PHAs). Voucher
recipients are responsible for finding suitable units where the landlords agree to rent under
the program. The maximum subsidy available to families, essentially equal to the fortieth
to fiftieth percentile of the local private-market rent distribution, is governed by the Fair
Market Rent (FMR). Once households receive a voucher and find a suitable apartment,
families contribute 30% of their adjusted income to rent and utilities, with the rest covered
by vouchers. According to the HUD Picture of Subsidized Households (1998-2016), the
average housing voucher subsidy for a family is nearly $8000 per year, equivalent to the
annual salary of a minimum wage part-time worker.
Eligibility for the housing voucher program depends on family size and income. To be
eligible, a four-person family’s gross income may not exceed 50% of the median income for
the local Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The income cutoff is adjusted by family size.1
Although, roughly 25 million households qualify for federal rental assistance based on their
income, my calculation based on the SIPP and Census data shows that only 7% of eligible
households receive vouchers. By law, a public housing authority (PHA) must provide 75%
of available vouchers to applicants whose incomes do not exceed 30% of the local median
income, namely, extremely poor households. In particular, PHAs collect information on
family income, assets, and family composition to determine program eligibility. If eligible,
1For a three-person family, the household income cutoff is 90% of the four person’s family. For a two-
person family, the household income cutoff is 80% of the four person’s families. For a one-person family, the
household income cutoff is 70% of the four person’s family. For a five-person family, the household income
cutoff is 108% of the four person’s families. For a six-person family, the household income cutoff is 116% of
the four person’s families. For a seven-person family, the household income cutoff is 124% of the four person’s
family. For eight and above person’s family, the household income cutoff is 132% of the four person’s family.
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Figure 1: Federal Outlays for Housing and Cash Assistance Programs
Note: Outlays reported by the US Office of Management and Budget represented in 2010 dollars, deflated
using Consumer Price Index. Low-income cash assistance includes outlays associated with Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The data is a
5-year moving average of the raw data.
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Figure 2: Number of Households Receiving Housing Vouchers and Average Subsidy
Note: The red line is the number of households receiving housing vouchers from 1998-2018 and the blue line
the average subsidy amount per household per month in real terms (take 2010 as the base year). Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) Office of Policy Development and Research (PDR).
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PHAs put applicants on a waiting list. Housing authorities (PHAs) organize waiting lists in
three ways: (a) first come, first served; (b) random lottery; and (c) local preferences.2 Due
to high demand, waiting periods are lengthy, averaging as long as two years (HUD Picture
of Subsidized Households). Some housing authorities may even close their waiting lists when
they cannot assist more families in the near future.
Once they receive vouchers, families can keep receiving subsidies for as long as they stay
income eligible. According to the HUD Picture of Subsidized Households, the average length
of stay for housing voucher recipients was 5 years in 2004 and increased to 10 years by 2014.
The rationale for continuously subsidizing families is to assist the neediest families in the
long run and address the problem of low permanent income (Collinson et al., 2015).
The literature on the housing voucher program has evolved in three groups: (a) reduced
form papers that estimate the effect of the current housing voucher program on individual
outcomes such as labor supply, earnings, residential location, children’s outcomes, rental
prices, housing and neighborhood quality;3 (b) papers that estimate structural models to
evaluate the counterfactual consequences of the program (Moffitt, 1998; Mansur et al., 2002;
Leung et al., 2012); and (c) papers that summarize the housing assistance programs and
related research (Olsen, 2003; Collinson et al., 2015, 2019; Ellen, 2020). This strand of
the literature enhances our understanding of affordable housing programs and inspires more
research including my paper.
1.3 Data and Stylized Facts about Housing Vouchers
1.3.1 Data
The main data set comes from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2014 panels. The data set contains detailed information on
2For example, according to the Housing Vouchers Fact Sheet from HUD: “PHAs may give preference to
a family that is homeless or living in substandard housing, pays more than 50% of its income for rent, or is
involuntarily displaced.”
3See Jacob and Ludwig (2012); Jacob et al. (2015); Collinson and Ganong (2018); Kling et al. (2005);
Galiani et al. (2015); Eriksen and Ross (2015); Chetty et al. (2016) for more details.
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household demographics. In particular, it includes information on whether a household is
granted a housing voucher through the Section 8 program.4 I focus on the working age
(18-60) sample of household heads and their spouses who are eligible for housing vouchers,
i.e., household income less than 50 percent of the local median income. The sample includes
13,738 individuals with 146,560 observations.5 I use this sample to provide a bunch of stylized
facts about the housing voucher program. When estimating the lifecycle model, I further
restrict the sample to the cohort aged 18-28 in 1996 (born between 1968 and 1978), which
includes 3,474 individuals with 37,227 observations.
It is important to mention that the SIPP data only contains information on whether or
not a household receives a housing voucher, without further information on whether house-
holds applied for a housing voucher but failed to get it. To obtain the program participation
data, I turn to the American Housing Survey (AHS), where household heads were asked,
“Have you reported income to the local public housing authority (PHA)?” The answer to
this question could be a good proxy for applications to housing assistance because on the
one hand, only households who applied for housing assistance need to report their income
to PHAs; on the other hand, PHAs are only responsible for housing assistance programs.
Therefore, households who report their income to PHAs must apply for housing assistance.
This proxy may overestimate the application rate of the housing voucher program because
PHAs are responsible for both the housing voucher program and the public housing program.
The application rate calculated in this way also includes the application for the public hous-
ing program. However, the overestimation issue is not a serious problem because the housing
voucher program is the largest federal housing assistance program and the public housing
program is becoming less popular (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). The other
concern is that the data is only available for years 1997-2005, so I assume that application
4For 1996-2008 panels, households are surveyed every 4 months for a few waves. To avoid the well-known
“seam effect” in the SIPP (Young, 1989), I keep only the 4th monthly observations in a given wave for each
household. For the 2014 panel, respondents are interviewed annually rather than three times per year; the
reference period covered in each interview is the previous 12 months. To be consistent with the 1996-2008
panel data, I keep the 4th, 8th, and 12th-month observation for the 2014 panel.
5The geographical area provided in SIPP is the state and a dummy variable indicates metro vs non-metro
area. I use the median incomes for each state’s metro vs non-metro areas as the cutoff income to infer
household program eligibility. I compare the inferred SIPP eligible sample to American Housing Survey
eligible sample inferred from MSA median income and I do not find a significant difference between the two
samples.
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rates for the years 2006-2016 are the same as previous years. In the robustness check section,
I will test robustness of the main result by relaxing the assumptions. To make it consistent
with the SIPP data, I apply the same sample selection criteria to the AHS data as well.
1.3.2 Stylized Facts
In this section, I present stylized facts about the housing voucher program: a) hous-
ing vouchers recipients have lower socioeconomic status, and housing assistance can reduce
household rent burden by as much as 50%; b) housing vouchers are negatively associated
with people’s employment, homeownership, and family formation.
I present summary statistics of the sample from the SIPP in Table 1. Column (1) reports
the characteristics for the full sample. The statistics for voucher recipients and nonrecipients
are reported in columns (2) and (3). Column (4) reports the summary statistics for the
sample used for estimating the model. Voucher recipients have a much lower employment
rate than nonrecipients. Average monthly earnings are $1,310 and $1,850 for people with or
without vouchers. Voucher recipients have a lower marriage rate (16%) and a higher divorce
rate (23%). About 33% of the overall sample and 27% of the estimation sample owns a home.
The percentages of people that ever received a voucher throughout the observation periods
are 12% and 14% for the full sample and estimation sample, respectively. Voucher recipients
have a much lower average rent ($324) due to the assistance. Most of the sample, voucher
users in particular, consists of female-headed households and households with children.
To compare the characteristics of voucher applicants to nonapplicants. I apply the AHS
data and divide the sample based on applications. I further compare the statistics of voucher
recipients to nonrecipients conditional on applications. Column (1) of Table 2 reports the
characteristics for the full sample, which uses the same selection criteria as the SIPP data.
Columns (2) and (3) report the characteristics of the sample that either receives or does not
receive vouchers conditional on applying for vouchers. Column (4) reports the characteristics
for the sample that does not apply for vouchers and the last column reports the characteristics
for the estimation sample. The average application rate is 15% for the full sample and 17%
for the estimation sample. Comparing voucher applicants to nonapplicants, we can see that
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (SIPP)
Variables All Receiving Not receiving Estimation
sample housing vouchers housing vouchers sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment
Male employment rate 0.58 0.27 0.58 0.58
Female employment rate 0.42 0.37 0.43 0.43
Monthly earnings 1,833 1,310 1,850 1,766
Household formation
Married 0.39 0.16 0.40 0.44
Divorced 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.12
Homeownership 0.33 0.01 0.35 0.27
Share with children 0.51 0.59 0.5 0.7
Vouchers and rent
Share ever w/ vouchers 0.12 1 0 0.14
Rent 666 324 673 683
Demographics
Age 41 40 41 33
Male 0.36 0.21 0.37 0.33
White 0.69 0.52 0.69 0.69
N. of obs 146,480 5,812 140,668 37,227
N. of individuals 13,181 1,656 12,084 3,474
Note: Data is drawn from the SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2014 Panel) and AHS (1997-2005).
Employment is defined as usual hours worked greater than or equal to 20 hours per week. “Share ever w/
vouchers” is the share of people that ever received a voucher throughout the years I observe them. Earnings
is defined as labor income, such as wage and salary.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (AHS)
Variables All Applying for Not applying for Estimation
sample housing vouchers housing vouchers sample
Receiving Not receiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Application rate
Application rate 0.15 1 1 0 0.17
Earnings and rent
Monthly earnings 1,790 1,409 1,502 1,841 1,818
Rent 666 561 762 694 683
Household formation
Married 0.34 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.34
Divorced 0.18 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.09
Homeownership 0.3 0 0 0.36 0.18
N. of children 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.6
Demographics
Age 38 37 37 38 29
Male 0.42 0.17 0.29 0.46 0.38
White 0.63 0.49 0.48 0.66 0.6
N. of obs 50,153 1,381 6,310 42,462 14,244
Note: Data is drawn from AHS (1997-1999 and 2001-2005). The overall sample is individuals who age
between 18-60 and are eligible for the housing voucher program. The estimation further restricts the sample
to the cohort born between 1968-1978. Earnings is defined as labor income, such as wage and salary. The
AHS data doesn’t provide information on employment so it’s not reported here.
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applicants are negatively selected in terms of earnings and household formation. Between
voucher recipients and nonrecipients, we see that recipients have a lower average earning and
a lower marriage rate, but a higher divorce rate. Recipients are likely to be women and have
more children.
I now provide empirical evidence of the relation between the program and labor supply,
family formation, and homeownership. The reduced form evidence contributes to existing
literature by providing evidence using a national and long time span sample. It also con-
tributes to the literature by providing more evidence of the effect of housing vouchers on
family formation and homeownership. To control for selection across families, I employ the
individual fixed-effect model to explore the within-individual change of receiving housing
vouchers.
In particular, I estimate the following specification
Yit = βV oucherit +Xitγ + ft + fi + εit
where i denotes individual and t denotes year-4th month. Yit is the set of outcomes of inter-
ests, including employment dummy, marriage dummy, divorce dummy, and homeownership
dummy. V oucherit is a dummy variable of receiving a housing voucher. It equals to one
if the individual’s family receiving a housing voucher and zero otherwise. Xit is a set of
individual-level controls, including gender, race, disability, age, education, state fixed effect,
state-specific time trend. The terms ft and fi are year-4th month fixed effect and individual
fixed effect. The error term is εit.
The fixed-effect estimates are reported in Table 3. Column (1) shows that receiving a
voucher is associated with a 2.1 percentage points decline in employment, which is equivalent
to a 4.5 percent reduction of the mean employment rate. The point estimate is significant at
the 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient in column (2) is -0.034 and significant at the 1% level,
implies that vouchers are associated with a 3.4 percentage points decline in homeownership
(10 percent of the mean homeownership rate). When it comes to marriage and divorce,
having a voucher is negatively correlated with marriage (2.5% reduction and significant at
the 1% level) and positively correlated with divorce (1% increase). The magnitude of the
estimates from the individual fixed-effect model is much smaller than that from the pooled
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OLS model (showed in Table 25), implying a negative selection of voucher recipients. To
sum up, the reduced form evidence suggests that vouchers are negatively associated with
people’s employment, homeownership, and family formation.
Table 3: Effects of Housing Vouchers on Household Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Employed Homeowner Married Divorced
Housing vouchers -0.021** -0.034*** -0.025*** 0.009
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var 0.46 0.33 0.40 0.18
Observations 146,480 146,560 146,560 146,560
Number of Individuals 13,181 13,181 13,181 13,181
Note: Data is drawn from the SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, and 2014 Panel). All estimates control for
disability status, age, individual fixed effect, state fixed effect, metro dummy, year fixed effect, and state-
specific time trend. Eligibility is inferred from state median income and metro status. Standard errors are
in parentheses, clustered by individuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.4 A Model Demonstrating Household Decisions
Economic theory yields ambiguous predictions about the effect of housing vouchers on
labor supply, marital status, and homeownership. In addition to providing generous sub-
sidies, the amount of rent paid by the program is inversely related to family income. The
static labor supply theory implies a negative effect on labor supply through both income and
substitution effects. However, the dynamic response of labor supply to housing assistance
may be different. On the one hand, vouchers are associated with long-term benefits, which
increase lifetime permanent income. On the other hand, once households receive vouchers,
their marginal tax rate will be higher. If people work more in periods when wage rates are
high, and if the intertemporal substitution effect dominates the lifetime income effect, then
labor supply could increase (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012). Other than the static and dynamic
substitution and income effects, the program could also affect labor supply through multiple
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channels. For example, housing vouchers could generate nonlinearities in budget constraints,
housing and non-housing goods could be complementary, and vouchers are associated with
changing labor market opportunities (Shroder, 2002; Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Chan and
Moffitt, 2018; Moffitt and Kosar, 2020). Therefore, the effect of housing vouchers on labor
supply is ambiguous due to the composition of multiple channels.
The housing voucher program also alters the insurance value of marriage and has an am-
biguous effect on family formation. On the one hand, housing assistance subsidizes housing
consumption and promotes wealth accumulation, which makes individuals more attractive
in the marriage market and increases marriage rate. On the other hand, housing assistance
may depress marriage rate by raising the value of outside options to marriage. Without
housing vouchers, some low-income people have to rely on their partners for housing con-
sumption. But if given vouchers, these people could afford to live independently. In addition,
housing assistance eligibility depends on family size, which is closely associated with marital
status. Ceteris paribus, changes in family size due to marriage or divorce may directly alter
the probability of receiving a housing voucher. Therefore, the motivation for marriage and
divorce depends on housing benefits associated with family formation (dis-formation).
As implied in the term “housing assistance,” the housing voucher program could sub-
stantially impact homeownership decisions. The program subsidizes rent and is favorable to
non-homeowners. Households with vouchers face reduced rental rates in the private market,
which makes renting more attractive and discourages home buying. Despite these factors,
housing assistance may in fact promote homeownership by increasing wealth accumulation,
which is a prerequisite for home buying. Hence, the overall effect of housing assistance on
homeownership is ambiguous.
Another important issue is how much these lifecycle decisions, i.e., labor supply, marriage,
and homeownership, interact with each other. For instance, employment/unemployment
may decrease/increase benefits of marriage, which affects family formation. Labor income
and marriage are important determinants of homeownership (De Gayardon et al., 2018), and
homeownership has a dynamic impact on labor supply and marriage (Fortin, 1995; Stevenson
and Wolfers, 2007). What is needed is a unified framework to incorporate all the lifecycle
decisions; this will allow us to study the impact of the housing voucher program on household
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behavior and welfare.
The stylized facts from Section 3 show that housing vouchers are negatively associated
with employment, marriage, and homeownership. Motivated by stylized facts and economic
theory, I have built a lifecycle model to study the effect of the current program and alter-
native reforms on household behavior and welfare. People work from age j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J},
after which point they retire. Each period in the model corresponds to 5 years in real life.
People obtain utility from two forms of consumption: goods and housing, where housing
consumption comes from renting or owning. In addition to consumption, people suffer from
the disutility of working and the stigma cost of participating in the housing voucher program.
At the beginning of each period, we can predict men (M) and women’s (F ) labor produc-
tivity as well as women’s likelihood of having children, depending on their marital status and
age. There is a certain probability of single people (S) meeting a potential partner randomly
drawn from the distribution of remaining singles. Given a random initial love shock and
their specific characteristics, single people and potential partners (if they meet) will decide
whether to get married. Married couples (M) know the realization of a love shock to mar-
riage at the beginning of each period and decide whether to remain married or not. Single
households or married households also decide whether to apply for a voucher in each period.
Based on the rationing system, they may get a voucher depending on gender, whether having
children, and household income. If the applicant does receive a housing voucher, they will
receive subsidized rental housing, for which they contributes a sum equal to 30% of their
monthly income. The voucher recipients may lose their vouchers either due to ineligibility
or shocks to their voucher status. Besides housing assistance, they may also receive welfare
benefits from TANF, Food Stamps, and EITC, which are exogenously given and depend on
gender, labor income, number of children, and marital status. In all cases, they also make
labor supply and homeownership decisions, how much to save in non-housing assets, and
how much to consume in goods. The housing voucher program affects households’ decisions
regarding labor supply, homeownership, and family formation through its impact on budget
constraints and subsidies to housing consumption.
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1.4.1 Preference
The utility of a single agent of gender g ∈ {W,M} in period t is denoted by






− φSg(N)lit − νBit
where cit > 0 is goods consumption and sit > 0 is housing consumption, which is defined as
s =
 h, if rentωh, if own (1)
where h ∈ [hmin, ..., hmax] is the housing size (quality). If renting a house, housing consump-
tion is the same as the housing size, h. If owning a house, housing consumption is ωh, where
ω > 1 captures the extra utility of owning a house. In addition, the term lit ∈ {0, 1} stands
for labor supply, a measure of extensive labor supply margin; the term φSg(N) is the disutil-
ity from working, which is gender and children dependent. Only single female’s disutility of
working depends on children. Children affect males if he is married to a woman. The term
Bit ∈ {0, 1} is the housing voucher program application decision and ν is the stigma cost
associated with an application.






− φMg(N)lMgit − νBit +Qit
where cit > 0 and sit > 0 are joint goods consumption and housing consumption. The
parameter γe ∈ (0.5, 1) captures the economy of scale within a household. The utility of
married men and women depends on the disutility from working φMg(N)lMgit , the stigma
cost of housing voucher application νBit, and the match quality Qit (love shock).
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1.4.2 Shocks To Household
Households face three sources of shocks: earnings, marriage and fertility, and the housing
voucher program.

















it ∼ N(0, σ2ζg)
where zgit is the permanent income component that follows a random walk process with
innovation ζgit; the term ε
g
it is the measurement error, which is i.i.d and normally distributed
as N(0, σ2εg). Because a large share of low-income people (both man and woman) do not
work, I take into account endogenous selection in work when estimating the wages.
Marriage and fertility In each period, a single agent meets with probability λj a
potential spouse (of the same age group), who is characterized by certain labor productivity,
assets, and housing. The probability λj varies by age as marriage rate varies by age. The
potential couple then draws a match quality Q0 ∼ N(0, σ2Q0). If they decide to marry, their
match quality follows a random walk with innovations ξQ
Qit = Qit−1 + ξQ, where ξQ ∼ N(0, σ2Q)
Fertility is stochastic and exogenous. The probability of having children depends on
females’ marital status (Mit) and age (j), which is:
Pr(Nit = 1|Nit−1 = 0;Mit, j)
For simplicity, I assume each woman only have one child.
Housing assistance For housing assistance, households can apply for a housing voucher
in each period. Since each PHA may have its own preference for ranking applicants on
a waiting list and thereby the probability of receiving a voucher is not purely random,
I model the probability of getting vouchers as a function of gender, children dummy, and
household income (I), i.e., γ(g,N, I). This will capture local preferences based on observable
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demographics.6 Once receiving a voucher, households can hold it as long as it remains eligible.
But households with vouchers also face a shock ξ that vouchers may be destroyed.
In addition to housing assistance, low-income households tend to be recipients of other
welfare benefits, i.e., Food Stamps, TANF, and EITC. The targeting of TANF and EITC is
mainly female-headed households.7 Since endogenously modeling multiple welfare take-up
and benefits is complex, I estimate take-up and benefits of Food Stamps, TANF, and EITC
using the SIPP data outside the model. For Food Stamps, I estimate the welfare benefit as a
linear function of gender, marital status, children, and labor income. Similarly, I model the
welfare benefit of TANF as a linear function of marital status, children, and labor income
and it is only estimated using a female-headed household sample. For EITC, the benefit is
calculated based on marital status, children, and labor income according to EITC policies.
The EITC is only applied to single female or married couples.
1.4.3 Household Problem
1.4.3.1 Single Women
At each age of j, a single female-headed household decides whether to work, whether to
apply for a housing voucher, whether to buy a house, and how much to consume and save.
The decision to marry (or divorce) takes place at the beginning of each period, after labor
market shocks and marriage shocks are realized, but before any consumption and program
participation decisions. Application for a voucher will be conditional on the marriage de-
cision that occurs at the beginning of the period. Conditional on realization of a voucher,
households will make a decision on labor supply, saving, goods consumption, and housing
consumption.
6Local governments establish their preference of what priorities they give to applicants and people have
a uniform marginal cost of program participation. However, the stigma cost could be heterogeneous and
differs by income, gender, and fertility. Both government priorities and individual-specific stigma cost would
introduce some heterogeneity into the group of people who get into the housing voucher program. Since
government priorities and heterogeneous stigma cost are not separately identified, I combine them both into
the government decision, leaving the stigma cost as homogeneous.
7Single men without children could be eligible for EITC benefits, though the benefits are much smaller
(https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-earned-income-tax-credit). Allowing them to
have EITC benefits does not affect the outcomes of this paper.
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If she receives a voucher, her budget constraint is:
c+ d′ = 0.7[wl + b(1− l) + tanf ] + fs+ eitc+ a
If she doesn’t receive a housing voucher, her budget constraint becomes:
c+ d′ + PHh′1{own} + P
Rh1{rent} + Φ(h
′, h) = wl + b(1− l) + tanf + fs+ eitc+ a,
where d is the non-housing assets, w is the wage rate, and b is the unemployment benefits.
The terms tanf , fs, and eitc represent benefits from TANF, Food Stamps, and EITC. The
terms PH and PR denote the housing price and rental price. The term 1{own} (or 1{rent}) is
an index function equal to 1 if being homeowners (or renters) and 0 otherwise. The term
Φ(h, h′) denotes transition costs if an agent buys a house or sells a house. Similar to Yang




Hh, if h 6= h′
0, if h = h′
In addition, the term a is total assets including both housing assets (if homeowners) and
non-housing assets, which is a = PHh+ (1 + r)d.
The budget constraint depends on whether a single woman gets a housing voucher or
not. If getting a voucher, she needs to contribute 30% of gross income (labor income and
benefits from TANF) to rent (left with 70% of gross income).8 If not getting a voucher,
she has to pay rent if she’s not a homeowner. If being homeowners, households have access
to collateralized borrowing. The term η captures the tightness of collateralized borrowing
constraint d′ ≥ −ηPHh′. The borrowing interest rate rHd is supposed to be higher than the
savings interest rate rLd .
The state vector for a single woman is ΩSWit = {zFit , NSWit , hSWit , dSWit , v8SWit }, which is
composed of labor productivity, children, housing, non-housing assets, and housing vouchers.
With probability λj, at the beginning of each period a single woman meets a man with
8The HUD rent calculations exclude certain benefits but include others in the determination of income.
Benefits that count toward income and rent calculations include: UI, SSDI, SSI, and TANF; HUD excludes
most benefits tied to medical expenses from the calculation of adjusted income used to set rent. HUD
excludes SNAP benefits, LIHEAP, earnings from or payments from participation in WIA programs, and
EITC refunds in the income calculation (Collinson et al., 2015).
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characteristics {z̃it, d̃it, h̃it, ṽ8it}, where ṽ8it ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the man has a housing
voucher. The potential couple then draws an initial match quality Qi0. If a match is formed,
then Mit = 1; otherwise Mit = 0.
Let V SWit (Ω
SW





denote the value function for a married woman at time t. A single woman maximizes the
following value function s.t. the budget constraint.
V SWit (Ω
SW
it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
uSWit (c, s, l, B)+
βE[λt+1[(1−Mi,t+1)V SWit+1(ΩSWit+1) +Mi,t+1V MWit+1 (ΩMWit+1 )] + (1− λt+1)V SWit+1(ΩSWit+1)]
1.4.3.2 Single Men
A single male-headed household also decides whether to work, whether to apply for a
housing voucher, whether to buy a house, and how much to consume and save in each period.
However, a single man will be affected by children only if he is married to a woman. The
state space for a single man is ΩSMit = {zMit , hSMit , dSMit , v8SMit }.
If he receives a housing voucher, his budget constraint is:
c+ d′ = 0.7[wl + b(1− l)] + fs+ a
If he doesn’t receive a housing voucher, his budget constraint is:
c+ d′ + PHh′1{own} + P
Rh1{rent} + Φ(h
′, h) = wl + b(1− l) + fs+ a
The budget constraint of a single man is similar to a single woman, but a single man is
only eligible for Food Stamp benefits.
Let V SMit (Ω
SM





denote the value function for a married man at time t. The problem for a single man is to
maximize the following value function s.t. the budget constraint.
V SMit (Ω
SM
it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
uSMit (c, s, l, B)+
βE[λt+1[(1−Mi,t+1)V SMit+1(ΩSMit+1) +Mi,t+1V MMit+1 (ΩMMit+1 )] + (1− λt+1)V SMit+1(ΩSMit+1)]
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1.4.3.3 Married Couple
When a man and a woman get married, they make joint decisions on labor supply,
program participation, consumption, and savings to maximize the joint household value.
Each partner is equally weighted (0.5) in the joint household value.
The joint budget constraint of a married couple with a housing voucher is
c+ d′ = 0.7[wM lM + wW lW + b(1− lM) + b(1− lW ) + tanf ] + fs+ eitc+ a
The joint budget constraint of a married couple without a housing voucher is
c+d′+PHh′1{own}+P
Rh1{rent}+Φ(h
′, h) = wM lM+wW lW+b(2−lM−lW )+tanf+fs+eitc+a
The state space for a couple is ΩMit = {zFit , zMit , NMit , Qit, hMit , dMit , v8Mit }. Let V Mit (ΩMit ) be the
joint value function of a married couple. Then the problem of a household is to maximize
the following value function s.t the household budget constraint.
V Mit (Ω
M
it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
0.5(uMMit (c, s, l, B) + u
FM










where di,t+1 is the divorce decision at next period.
Men and women will get married or remain married if and only if the value of being
married is no less than the value of being single, i.e.,
V MWit (Ω
M
it ) ≥ V SWit (ΩSWit )
V MMit (Ω
M




it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
uMWit (c, s, l, B) + βE[(1− di,t+1)V MWit+1 (ΩMit+1) + di,t+1V SWit+1(ΩSWit+1]
V MMit (Ω
M
it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
uMMit (c, s, l, B) + βE[(1− di,t+1)V MMit+1 (ΩMit+1) + di,t+1V SMit+1(ΩSMit+1]
are value functions of married women and men.
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1.5 Estimation
The estimation is based on the 1970 cohort of households that are presumably eligi-
ble for the housing voucher program. I estimate the model parameters in three steps.
First, I calibrate some parameters outside the model. Second, I estimate earnings pa-
rameters, fertility process, and the distribution of potential spouses directly from the data
without imposing the model structure. Finally, I estimate the remaining parameters in-
ternally by the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM). These parameters include pref-
erence parameters (ω, φSM , φMM , φSW , φMW0 , φ
MW
1 , ν), those governing marriage dynamics
(σ2Q0, σ
2
Q, λy, λm), policy parameters related to the uncertainty around receiving a voucher,
γ(.) as well as parameters governing the probability of losing housing vouchers, ξ. I simulate
the theoretical moments and minimize the difference between simulated moments and data
moments.
1.5.1 Initial Conditions
I first specify the initial conditions of the model. In the model, people start at age 18. By
that age, only a small share of men and women have gotten married and given birth. Almost
none of the sample owns a house or has experienced a divorce. Therefore, the proportions
of married men and women, the proportion of women with children (separately for married
and single women), and the proportions of men and women owning a house at age 18 are all
set to zero.
1.5.2 Externally Calibrated Parameters
The values and references of the externally calibrated parameters are reported in Table
26. Agents are assumed to have a constant risk aversion coefficient of γ = 1.5. The annual
discount factor is β = 0.98, which turns into a 5-year discount factor of β = 0.9. Following
Kaplan et al. (2017), the share of goods consumption in the utility function is α = 0.8.
In other words, the share of housing consumption in the utility function is 0.2. Following
Eckstein et al. (2019), the economy of scale is set to 0.7, so a couple needs 40% more
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expenditure than a single person to obtain an equivalent consumption level. I obtained the
downpayment rate from the Freddie Mac Loan-to-Value ratio for prime mortgages, which is
0.2. Based on Yang (2009), I set the transition costs as 2.5% of home value for buying and
7% of home value for selling. The interest rates for positive assets (savings) and negative
assets (debt) are 2% and 7%, set to match the bank net interest margin.
1.5.3 Externally Estimated Parameters
For both men’s and women’s earnings, selection into employment is a concern because
wages are not observed for unemployed people and decisions to work depend on wage offers.
To estimate the age profiles of men’s and women’s wages and to account for non-working when
estimating the variance of the productivity shocks, I apply a two-step Heckman selection
correction procedure. Following Low and Pistaferri (2015), the exclusion restrictions in the
employment equation are “simulated” welfare benefits. I use state, year, and demographic
variation in simulated Food Stamp, EITC, and Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits for
a single man who works part-time at the federal minimum wage. In contrast, for single
women with varying numbers of children who work part-time at the federal minimum wage,
I added TANF benefits. In each specification, I control for time and state fixed effect so the
instruments capture differential changes in policy over time and states. The key identification
assumption is that the welfare benefits affect men and women’s wages only through their
impact on employment. The first stage showing the effect of welfare benefits on employment
for men and women is in Table 39.
I then apply a variance-covariance decomposition framework with selection correction
to estimate the variance of productivity shock and variance of measurement error. I report
wage parameters in Table 28. The variances of permanent income shock for men and women
are 0.09 and 0.08. The variances of measurement error for men and women is 0.11 and 0.06,
respectively. Men’s and Women’s wages have a concave lifecycle profile as expected.9
I compute the transition probability for women from no children to one child using the
SIPP data. The Markov process for fertility is a function of a woman’s age and marital status.
9For more details in estimating earning process, see online appendix C.
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The estimated transition probabilities are in Figure 25. The distribution of characteristics of
single men and women come from the age-dependent distribution of characteristics for singles
in the data. According to the model, people will form expectations about the matches they
may be involved in based on the distribution of remaining singles.
1.5.4 Internally Estimated Parameters
I apply the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) (McFadden, 1989) to estimate the
remaining parameters. I choose parameters that will minimize the distance between the data
moments and the simulated moments generated from the model.
min{Θ}(φdata − φsim)′W (φ̂data − φsim)
The vector Θ contains the extra utility from being homeowners (ω); the variance of initial
match quality (σ2Q0) and the variance of shocks to existing marriage (σ
2
Q); the probability of
meeting someone at young and middle age (λy, λm); the disutility from working for single
men (φSM) and for married men (φMM), the disutility from working for single women (φSW ),
for married women without children (φMW0 ), and married women with children (φ
MW
1 ); the
stigma cost of participating in the program ν; the shock to losing vouchers for voucher
recipients (ξ) and the probability of receiving a voucher for men and women with higher and
lower-income, and for women with or without children γ(.).
Empirical moments φdata are calculated from the 1968-1978 birth cohort for the years
1996-2016. I focus on household heads and their spouses who are aged 18-48. I group
the sample into 5-year bin age groups: 18-22, 23-27, 28-32, 33-37, 38-42, and 43-48. The
marriage and divorce rates are calculated in corresponding age bins. Simulated moments
φsim are computed using the full numerical solution of the model, with the inverse of the
variance-covariance matrix of the empirical moments as the weighting matrix W .
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1.5.5 Identification
Although all of the moments are used to estimate all of the parameters, some moments
are especially important in identifying certain parameters. I provide a heuristic argument
for how each of the parameters can be identified from a subset of the moments and give the
intuition for identification.
The first set of moments includes conditional moments for labor supply, i.e., proportions
of men employed by marital status and fractions of women employed by marital and fertility
status. These moments pin down the disutility of work for men and women. The second set
of moments consists of the proportion of households that applied for a housing voucher and
the proportions of applicants that receive a voucher by income, gender, and fertility. The
application rate helps determine the stigma cost of participation, and the proportions of
voucher recipients by income, gender, and fertility help indicate the probability of getting a
voucher for different demographics. In addition, the proportion of households who have lost
housing vouchers determines the probability of losing housing vouchers in the model. The
third set of moments contains the average homeownership rate, which pins down the extra
utility from being homeowners. The fourth set of moments includes marriage and divorce
rates by age, as well as the share of having ever been married by age. These moments
contribute to pinning down the variance of marriage shocks and the probability of meeting
a partner.
1.5.6 Model Fit and Estimated Parameters
The model fit for the moments is shown in Table 19 and the one for the evolution of
marriage and divorce by age is shown in Figure 12.10 The model can replicate the targeted
moments and also reproduce statistics that were not targeted by the estimation procedure.
An important set of statistics are employment, marriage, and divorce rate conditional on
housing voucher recipients. Another important set of statistics consists of homeownership
and application rates by gender. These statistics are not targeted by the model but demon-
strate the behavior by voucher recipients and gender. Table 29 shows that the model can
10The fraction of ever married by age is shown in Figure 19.
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replicate behavior of the voucher users as well as gender differences.
Table 4: Model Fit (Percentage)
Model Data 95% CI
Homeownership rate 27 27 (26, 28)
Single male employment 58 58 (56, 59)
Married male employment 76 77 (75, 78)
Single female employment 53 53 (52, 54)
Married female w/o children employment 45 46 (42, 48)
Married female w/ children employment 36 35 (34, 36)
Housing assistance application 18 17 (16, 18)
Note: Homeownership rate and employment rates and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) are calculated
from the SIPP. Housing assistance application and its 95% CI is calculated from the AHS.
Figure 3: Marriage and Divorce by Age (Percentage)
Note: The blue lines are the marriage and divorce rate by age calculated from the SIPP data. The red lines
are the marriage and divorce rate by age simulated from the model. The dotted lines are the 95% CI.
In addition to validating non-targeted moments, I have compared predictions of the
model with evidence from the reduced form literature. What I found is that the model
can reproduce statistics about the housing voucher program that are not targeted by the
estimation procedure (external validity). I simulate the model for men and women over
35-year period. I then use the simulated data to estimate the effects of housing vouchers on
labor supply, homeownership, marriage, and divorce. Table 30 presents the results. The first
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column shows the effect of housing voucher use on labor supply. Housing vouchers reduce
labor supply by 3.4 percentage points, implying a 6.3 percent reduction of the average labor
supply and a 6 percent reduction of the control mean (the control group is the group that
didn’t receive housing vouchers). Estimates from the model-simulated data are similar to the
findings from Jacob and Ludwig (2012), according to which housing vouchers reduce labor
supply by around 4 percentage points (6 percent of the control mean). Similarly, Mills et al.
(2006) found that housing vouchers reduced the quarterly employment rate by 4 percentage
points (8 percent of the control mean); however, the effect is only significant during the first
year with vouchers.
Table 31 reports internally estimated parameters and their standard errors. The pa-
rameter governing the extra utility of being homeowners is estimated to be 1.01, implying
that homeownership yields a higher utility flow. The variances of the shock to the initial
marriage match and to existing marriages are estimated to be 0.08 and 0.1, respectively. The
probabilities of meeting someone at a young age (18-38) and middle age (38-48) are 0.42 and
0.63, respectively. The disutility from working is higher for married women than that for
single women and the disutility from working for women with children is higher than that
for women without children. These parameters help us to match the employment patterns
for single and married women with or without children.
The stigma cost of housing is estimated at 0.135, which is identified by the eligible
households who are not applying for housing vouchers. To understand the magnitude of the
parameter, I compute the proportional decrease in average consumption that an individual
would be willing to bear for one period in order to avoid incurring the stigma for the same
period, i.e., I find the τ such that u(c(1− τ)) = u(c)− ν, where c is an agent’s average per
period consumption. The result shows that τ = 6%.
The probability of losing housing vouchers is estimated at 0.21 for a model period (5
years), converted to 0.04 annually. The low annual probability of losing vouchers suggests
that housing vouchers tend to concentrate on a few households for a long period of time.
The conditional probabilities of applicants receiving vouchers are reported for high-income
and low-income males (γlm = 0.18, γhm = 0.2), high-income and low-income females with
children (γlwc = 0.35, γhwc = 0.45) or without children (γlwnc = 0.2, γhwnc = 0.2). The
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parameters imply that females are more likely to receive a voucher than males and females
with children are more likely to get a voucher than females without children.
1.6 Policy Experiments
The most important use of the model and structural estimates is to study the effects
of potential reforms on household behavior and welfare. I consider four reforms in policy
experiments. First, I change the housing subsidy into flat assistance, where every recipient
household gets the same amount of assistance. The policy attempts to remove the nega-
tive substitution effect of housing vouchers. Second, I provide lower benefits to all eligible
households that apply for the program. Third, I introduce time limits on receiving housing
subsidies. For instance, I consider a scenario where housing voucher users can only receive
assistance for a maximum of 5 years. The intent behind the second and third reforms are
to mitigate the problem of rationing. Fourth, I allow households to use vouchers to buy
homes, for example, using vouchers to pay for downpayments. For each policy, I show the
implications for low-income household labor supply, family formation, homeownership, pro-
gram participation, and welfare. I calculate the welfare effect by measuring a household’s
willingness to pay for the new policy through a proportional reduction in consumption at
all ages that would make the individual indifferent ex-ante between the status quo and the
policy change considered. To keep government revenue neutral, government expenditure on
the housing voucher program in all experiments is matched to that in the baseline. These
policy experiments are best interpreted as investigating the partial equilibrium effects of
each reform because I do not take into account general equilibrium effects, nor do I consider
introducing multiple reforms simultaneously. In Section 1.7, I will discuss the evidence of the
program’s effect on rental prices and provide suggestive evidence of the general equilibrium
effect on my results.
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1.6.1 Flat Housing Assistance
In the current policy (baseline), the amount of housing assistance is inversely related to
recipients’ income. In this experiment, I consider the effect of a revenue-neutral change of
assistance into a flat subsidy for voucher recipients. The amount of flat assistance is set
such that government expenditure on the program in the experiment is equal to that in
the baseline. The new policy removes the negative substitution effect on labor supply and
redistributes assistance across recipient households: in the baseline model, relatively lower-
income households get more assistance than relatively higher-income households while in
the experiment, every successful applicant receives the same amount of assistance. The new
policy shifts resources from relatively lower-income households to relatively higher-income
households.11
The first two columns in Table 5 show the effect of the policy. The first column presents
the moments from the baseline and the second column shows the moments from the flat
assistance experiment. The policy has a positive impact on household labor supply due
to the removal of the negative substitution effect. In particular, the employment rate for
single men increases by 2 percentage points, which is about a 3.4 percent increase relative
to the mean employment rate in the baseline. Similarly, the employment rate for single
women increases by 2 percentage points, which is about a 3.8 percent increase relative to
the mean baseline employment rate. Furthermore, the effect of the policy on married men’s
and women’s employment is negligible because only a small share of married households
receive housing vouchers in the baseline and experiment. At the same time, the policy has
a positive impact on program participation. The application rate for the program rises from
18 percent in the baseline to 19 percent in the experiment, and it is the high-productivity
households that increase their applications. Housing vouchers are more attractive for high-
income households as they obtain more assistance in the policy environment. I have not
found a significant impact of the policy on marriage or homeownership.
11The sample for all the policy experiments is still the low-income households that are eligible for the
voucher program. “Low-income households” here refers to the extremely low-income households while “high-
income households” refers to the low-income households that are relatively rich.
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Table 5: Policy Experiments (Percentage)
Variables baseline flat assistance lower to all time limits home buying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment
single male 58 60 41 58 58
married male 76 76 75 76 76
single female 53 55 49 52 53
married female w/o kids 45 45 45 45 46
married female w/ kids 36 35 36 36 35
Household formation
marriage 40 40 37 40 42
divorce 9 10 8 9 9
homeownership 27 27 22 28 31
Program participation
overall 18 19 37 18 19
low-productivity 26 21 51 21 26
high-productivity 10 17 25 15 12
Note: “baseline” is the current program; “flat assistance” is the first experiment where every voucher
recipient household get a same amount of subsidy; “lower to all” is the second experiment where the
government provide lower benefits to all households applied for the program; “overall” is the application
rate for the full sample; “low-productivity” is the application rate among low labor productivity households
and “high-productivity” is the application rate among high labor productivity households.
32
1.6.2 Expanded Access with Lower Benefit Levels
In the second experiment, I consider providing modest benefits to an expanded popula-
tion, i.e., all eligible households applying for housing vouchers. The current program provides
substantial subsidies to only a few families, as it aims to address the problem of low perma-
nent income. However, the current program might be suboptimal because the more money
that is provided to the same households, the lower the marginal benefits become. Further-
more, if not properly targeting the families in most need, the high degree of rationing will
generate search costs, resource misallocation, and welfare loss in the long run (Glaeser and
Luttmer, 2003; Olsen, 2003; Collinson et al., 2019). In this experiment, housing vouchers
are not rationed, indicating that every needy family will be granted a voucher, though the
subsidy is less generous. To keep government revenue neutral and to preserve the negative
relation between subsidy amount and household income, voucher recipients still contribute
30% of their income for rent, but the fair market rent (or the maximum subsidy) is down-
wardly adjusted. I adjust the fair market rent to be 45% lower such that the government
budget is the same as the baseline.
Column (3) in Table 5 presents the result of the policy change. Providing lower benefits to
all applicants substantially increases program participation rate from 18% to 37% because
households will receive a voucher for sure if applied. The policy has a negative impact
on employment, marriage, and homeownership. In particular, the policy change reduces
single men’s and women’s labor supply by 17 percentage points and 4 percentage points. It
also reduces marriage and homeownership by 3 percentage points and 5 percentage points.
Two mechanisms are playing roles in affecting household behavior. On the one hand, as
more people are now receiving assistance from the program, the negative impacts of housing
vouchers on labor supply, marriage, and homeownership apply to a larger population. On the
other hand, the subsidy is less generous for the original voucher recipients in the baseline,
suggesting smaller disincentives for labor supply, homeownership, and marriage for these
households. The result shows that the former effect dominates the latter one, yielding an
overall negative impact on labor supply, marriage, and homeownership. What can explain
the large impact on labor supply for single men? This is because the new policy substantially
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increases single men’s incidence of receiving housing vouchers while the baseline policy favors
female-headed households by allocating the majority of vouchers to women. The share of
single men that receive a voucher increases from 4% in the baseline to 39% in the experiment,
which result in considerable working disincentives for males.
1.6.3 Time-limited Subsidies
Instead of a subsidy for an indefinite period, the third policy considers imposing time
limits on receiving housing assistance. This is the key spirit of of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which was to introduce
lifecycle time limits on receipt of welfare benefits. The current program allows households
to hold vouchers as long as they are eligible, which causes a high degree of concentration.
According to HUD, the average length of stay for housing voucher recipients in 2004 was 5
years, which increased to 10 years by 2014. The increase in the length of stay has several
consequences. First, it may discourage voucher users from working as increasing their income
will probably render them ineligible for the program. Second, a large subsidy for a long period
of time will alter the insurance value of marriage, thereby affecting family formation. Third,
housing voucher users tend to remain renters, if rent is continuously subsidized. Therefore,
apart from the impacts on voucher users, it will also affect households who are in need of
vouchers but cannot get one. When the households are hit by negative income shocks, the
insurance value of housing vouchers will be limited. This policy experiment seeks to mediate
the negative impact of concentration by imposing a maximum of 5 years (one model period)
of benefits. The subsidy amount that a household can receive within the 5-year is the same as
the baseline, which is the difference between rent and 30% of family income. Accordingly, the
probability of receiving a voucher conditional on applications will be increasing to maintain
the same government budget as the baseline. As a result, housing vouchers can reach more
families in need, but for a limited time. The new policy aims to address the problem of
income volatility rather than low permanent income.
I present the effect of introducing time limits in column (4) of Table 5. This policy has
a small negative impact on single female employment. This is likely because the negative
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income effect on labor supply is applied to an increased share of single female-headed house-
holds, who make up the majority of voucher recipients. However, the effect of this policy
on other demographic groups’ employment is negligible. Beyound employment, I do not
detect any significant impact of the policy on marriage or homeownership, nor do I find a
significant impact on applications to the program. However, if we take a closer look at the
application rate for high-productivity people vs low-productivity people, the application rate
of low-productivity people decreases as they gain less from the program due to time limits.
On the contrary, the application rate of high-productivity people increases as they have a
higher chance of receiving housing assistance.
1.6.4 Home Buying Option
In the last experiment, I consider giving households the option to use vouchers to buy
homes, instead of only using them for rent. In reality, the HUD has a Housing Choice
Voucher (HCV) homeownership program, which gives household assistance for homeowner-
ship. The program allows families that are assisted under the HCV program to use their
vouchers to buy a home and receive monthly assistance in meeting homeownership expenses.
However, though the HCV homeownership regulations provide a downpayment grant op-
tion (where the PHA offers a single downpayment assistance grant to the family instead
of a monthly homeownership subsidy), funding has not been appropriated for this purpose
and this regulatory provision has never been implemented. In this experiment, households
can use a voucher as a downpayment grant, as downpayments are the main constraint for
low-income households to buy a house (Herbert and Tsen, 2007). Compared to the current
program, this policy changes the relative cost of renting versus homeownership and promote
homeownership among low-income households. It may also encourage more people to apply
for housing vouchers, especially those who prefer to be homeowners.
The last column of Table 5 shows the effect of this policy. Allowing the home buying
option has a positive effect on marriage and homeownership. The homeownership rate in
the experiment increases by 4 percentage points, which is a 16 percent increase relative to
the baseline homeownership rate. The marriage rate increases by 1.5 percentage points,
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equivalent to 3 percent of the average marriage rate in the baseline. The positive effect on
marriage is likely due to the increased homeownership that makes marriage more attrac-
tive. As documented in existing literature, homeowners are more attractive in marriage
market because homeownership can yield higher utility flows (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007).
Homeowners also have higher incentives for marriage as partners can share their mortgage
payments (Fortin, 1995). In addition, the policy change also has a positive effect on program
participation. The application rate increases from 18 percent to 19 percent. If we take a
further look at the application rate by labor productivity, it is high-productivity people who
increase their applications. I do not find any impact of this policy on household labor supply.
1.6.5 Welfare
To study the welfare consequences of different policies, I measure welfare benefits (costs)
by the compensation variation, i.e., the percentage by which the consumption of people
would have to be increased in each state and in each period to leave that person indifferent
ex-ante between the baseline and the new policy. From a public policy perspective, welfare
is the most important indicators for policymakers to consider for future program reforms.
Table 6: Percent Change in Welfare
Compensation Variation All Women Men
Policy 1: flat assistance -0.2 -0.22 -0.18
Policy 2: lower subsidy to all +1.5 +1.2 +1.8
Policy 3: time-limited subsidy +0.6 +0.8 +0.4
Policy 4: home buying option +0.24 +0.23 +0.25
Note: The welfare for the current program (baseline) is normalized to 1.
For each scenario, welfare benefits (costs) for all low-income people as well as for men
and women separately are presented in Table 6. Compared to the baseline, the first policy of
changing housing assistance into a flat subsidy reduces overall welfare. This is because low-
income households’ welfare losses from a reduced subsidy dominates high-income households’
welfare gains from a greater subsidy, as low-income households have a higher marginal utility
of consumption. If we look at welfare by gender, it is women that are losing more, since the
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new policy benefits high-income households (or hurts low-income households) and men earn
more than women. Providing lower benefits to all eligible applicants substantially improves
welfare for both men and women (second row of Table 6). In the baseline the government
provides continued large assistance to only a few families, and marginal utility decreases
as benefits increase; in the new policy, housing subsidies are lower but assist more needy
families who have a greater marginal utility at those benefit levels. Men gain more from the
the policy because the policy substantially increases their incidence of receiving vouchers.
Time-limited subsidies increase overall welfare, especially for women. This increase in welfare
comes from families that have a higher chance of receiving vouchers due to the new policy.
Both of the latter two policies promote overall welfare by mitigating the rationing problem.
The last row of Table 6 presents the compensation variation of the experiment that allows
the home buying option. This policy improves welfare as it promotes homeownership and
the homeownership rate is associated with higher utility flow.
1.7 General Equilibrium Effects of Housing Vouchers
As a demand-side housing subsidy, the current housing voucher program and policy
reforms may impact rental and housing prices, which affect household behavior and welfare
through general equilibrium effects. A price increase would depend on elasticity of housing
and rental units supply. Susin (2002) uses the 90 biggest metropolitan areas in the U.S.
and finds that vouchers have raised rent by 16 percent on average, a large effect consistent
with low supply elasticity in the low-quality rental housing market. In contrast, Eriksen and
Ross (2015) use the U.S. national sample and do not find any effects of housing vouchers on
overall price of rental. In addition, using a California sample, Mansur et al. (2002) estimate
a general equilibrium model to show that the effect of housing vouchers on rent is quite
small: the increase in rent is below $70 a year and constitutes less than 1% of the base rent.
The existing evidence shows different impacts of housing vouchers on rental prices but
is consistent with the fact that the effect of housing vouchers on rent hinges critically on
the elasticity of housing supply. To provide more suggestive evidence of the voucher pro-
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gram’s effect on rental prices, I develop a separate framework (Zhang, 2020) and apply it in
each scenario. The framework builds a stationary equilibrium model to study the general
equilibrium effect of introducing housing vouchers and a variety of public policies related to
housing.12 Since elasticity of housing supply is critical to determining the effect on rental
prices, I experiment with various values of supply elasticity to examine the effect of the cur-
rent program on rental prices. I then apply the national median elasticity of housing supply
to investigate the effect of each policy change on rental prices. The result is presented in
Table 32.
Panel A of Table 32 shows the effect of the current program on rental prices. In an
inelastic housing supply case, e.g., where the elasticity of housing supply is lower than 1,
introducing the current program will increase rental prices by 5%. However, in an elastic
housing supply case, e.g., where elasticity of housing supply is 1.5, introducing the current
program will increase rental prices by 2%. In a more elastic housing supply case, e.g., where
the elasticity of housing supply is 2.3, introducing the current program barely has any effect
on prices.
Panel B of Table 32 shows the effect of the four policy reforms on rental prices. I consider
the case with a housing supply elasticity of 1.5, which is the national median elasticity among
all MSAs (Saiz, 2010). Compared to the baseline (where prices are normalized to 1), flat
housing assistance and time-limited subsidies have no significant impact on prices. Providing
lower benefits to all will increase rental prices by 2%. Since the average rent for low-income
households is $670 (during the sample period), a 2% increase in rent implies that rent will
increase by $13 per month, which is small. Allowing households to use vouchers to buy homes
has no impact on rental prices. When I apply the increase in rental prices in the baseline as
well as the experiments, the main results are robust with regard to the price change. This is
consistent with the existing evidence that housing vouchers have no impact on rental prices
when using national sample (Eriksen and Ross, 2015). Note that the general equilibrium
framework I applied here can at best provide suggestive evidence of the program’s effect on
rental prices because the assumptions for the general equilibrium model are quite different
than the ones for the current model.
12The detailed description of the general equilibrium model is presented in section D of the online appendix.
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1.8 More Results and Robustness Check
In this section, I first experiment with various program targets and the in-kind nature of
the program. I then examine the robustness of the main results with regard to the general
equilibrium effect of the housing voucher program and with regard to a variety of modeling
assumptions.
1.8.1 Various Program Targets
The effect of the housing voucher program depends on program targets. In this sub-
section, I consider a variety of program targets to examine the program’s effect on house-
hold behavior and welfare. First, since low-productivity households are in greater need of
vouchers than high-productivity households, I consider only giving housing vouchers to low-
productivity households. Second, since female-headed households are most likely to have
children and housing has potential spillover effects on children’s outcome (Jacob, 2004; Ja-
cob et al., 2015; Chetty et al., 2016; Schwartz et al., 2020), I consider only giving housing
vouchers to female-headed households. The results of the two experiments are reported in
Table 33 (column (2) and (3)) and in 34 (row (2) and (3)) in the appendix.
Column (2) of Table 33 shows that the effect on household behavior is minimal if hous-
ing vouchers are only given to low-productivity households. However, this policy substan-
tially increases household welfare, as shown in the second row of Table 34. This is because
low-productivity households have a higher marginal utility of consumption. Column (3) of
Table 33 shows that the female labor supply decreases if housing vouchers are only given to
female-headed households because the disincentives for working apply to more female-headed
households. In contrast, male-headed households work more as they cannot receive housing
assistance in this policy experiment. This policy also raise female-headed households well-
being and decrease male-headed households well-being, as shown in the third row of Table
34.
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1.8.2 Transfers in-kind vs Transfers in-cash
Transfers in-kind and transfers in-cash have different implications for household behavior
and welfare (Moffitt and Kosar, 2020; Chan and Moffitt, 2018). In this subsection, I consider
the effect of giving equivalent cash transfers instead of in-kind transfers to households. The
cash transfers can be used for both goods consumption and housing consumption. The
results are shown in column (4) of Table 33 in the appendix. Compared to in-kind transfers,
cash transfers have a larger negative impact on labor supply. This is consistent with existing
literature (Gahvari, 1994) showing that cash transfers create larger disincentives for working.
They are also more attractive to low-income households as they can spend the money on
whatever they want, so the application rate increases by 13 percentage points. In addition,
cash assistance can improve household welfare as they can consume any goods as needed
(last row of 33).
1.8.3 Robustness: Downpayment Rate for Low-income Households
In the model, the downpayment rate is 20% and uniformly applys to all households.
However, some households may qualify for lower downpayment rates, while others may not
qualify for mortgages. The very low-income households do not qualify for mortgages due
to low credit scores. On the other hand, some households may qualify for Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) loans and face lower downpayment rates. For instance, the downpay-
ment rates attached to FHA loans can be as low as 3.5%. In this experiment, households
will get different downpayment rates based on their credit scores. The credit score of each
household is predicted based on income, age, and cohort. People with a credit score below
600 do not qualify for mortgages. According to The Ellie Mae Origination Insight Report
(2019), about 20% of new home buyers get FHA loans. Therefore, I assign FHA loan down-
payment rates to 20% of the home buyers based on their credit scores. The estimation result
is shown in Table B.3 in the online Appendix.
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1.8.4 Robustness: Application Rate Changes Over Time
The application information is only available until 2005. The application rate in the
model is an upper bound estimation of the true rate of application within low-income house-
holds. In this robustness check section, I first relax the assumption that the application rate
is fixed over time and allow it to grow after 2005. To predict the growth rate of the appli-
cation rate, I apply the annual growth rate of the number of households receiving housing
voucher from HUD Picture of Subsidized Households (2006-2016) and assume the growth
rate of the application rate is the same as the growth rate of households receiving vouchers
over time. Therefore, the application rate is growing by 4% every year after 2005. After
this adjustment, the average application rate between 1996 and 2016 increases from 17% to
21%. Second, to account for the overestimation of the application rate due to the public
housing program, I employ the housing voucher program and the public housing program
data from the HUD Picture of Subsidized Households (1998-2016). The data set includes
information on the total number of households in each housing subsidy program and the
percent of households moved in the subsidized units less than a year. Such information
allows me to construct the flow of households into the housing voucher program and the
public housing program. The average increase of the number of households into the housing
voucher program is 386,089 while the average increase of the number of households into the
public housing program is 164,243 (28% of the overall application). Assuming the applica-
tion rate of the two programs is proportional to the assisted rate of the two programs, the
original application rate of the housing voucher program is overestimated by 28%. Thus, the
average application rate between 1996 and 2016 decreases from 21% to 15%. After the two
adjustments, the average application rate is 15%, which is similar to the original application
rate, 17%, used in the model. The main results are robust to such adjustments.
1.8.5 Robustness: Moving Costs
The current model does not feature moving costs, implying households can freely move
when receiving housing vouchers. However, the SIPP data shows that about 70% of house-
holds stay at their original house after receiving a housing voucher. The reluctance to move
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to areas with better housing could be explained by a number of barriers, including insuffi-
cient available housing, a lack of landlord recruitment, discrimination, limited information,
and a lack of familiarity, social ties, and acceptance (Schwartz et al., 2017).
To accommodate the barriers that prevent households from moving, I introduce moving
costs for the households. I estimate the model with moving costs and present the estimated
parameters in the table 35. The moving cost is about 4 months of average rent, which is
pinned down by matching the share of households moved to the data. Except for stigma
cost of program participation, all the values of the other estimated parameters are almost
the same as the ones without introducing moving costs. The stigma cost in the model with
moving costs is lower because the expected benefits from vouchers are less due to the moving
costs. Using the estimated parameters, I redo all the experiments and show that the results of
introducing moving costs in table 36. The simulations from models with or without moving
costs are similar, suggesting the main results are robust when introducing moving costs.
1.9 Conclusion
Economic theory yields ambiguous predictions of the housing voucher program’s effect
on labor supply, family formation, and homeownership. The evidence of the program’s effect
on household behavior and welfare from existing literature is limited. Until now, no study
has employed a national sample and has built a unified framework to examine the long-term
effect of the current program and its alternatives on household behavior and welfare. In this
paper, I take advantage of the welfare program take-up data and household socioeconomic
status data available from the SIPP and AHS to construct a structural model to study the
program’s long-term effect. This paper shows the behavioral response and welfare implication
of some stylized program reforms and provides a rigorous framework to examine any possible
program reforms. Despite its academic merits, this framework can be used as a practical
tool for policymakers to evaluate affordable housing policies.
The political debate focuses on the trade-off between the incentive costs and assistance
aspects of the program. For instance, the Bush administration proposed a “Flexible Voucher
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Plan” that reduces work disincentives and promotes self-sufficiency by introducing a time-
limited subsidy and flat subsidy (Husock, 2004). The Obama administration expanded the
housing voucher program to assist more low-income families (King, 2015). The Trump
administration proposes large cuts to affordable housing programs and subsidy adjustments
by local conditions (Fischer, 2017). The 2020 presidential candidate, Joe Biden, proposes
universal housing vouchers to every qualified family (Yglesias, 2020).
This study is relevant to the policy debates about the optimal design of housing programs
that date back to the launch of affordable housing policies in the 1930s. One of the debates is
on the trade-off between the disincentives created by the program and the assistance aspect
(anti-poverty) of the program (McClure, 2008). The flat housing assistance experiment shows
that the negative substitution effect distorts household labor supply decisions. If housing
assistance is flat instead of inversely related to family income, households will respond by
increasing labor supply. However, this policy will decrease welfare as it redistributes resources
from relatively low-income households to relatively high-income households.
My findings also provide rigorous evidence to the debate on the degree of rationing.
The debate centers around whether we should provide modest subsidies to an increased
number of households and whether we should consider time-limited subsidies (Collinson
et al., 2015; Olsen, 2016; Collinson et al., 2019). The policy experiment shows that providing
lower subsidies to more households will improve the overall welfare and such improvement
in welfare comes from the fact that more households are assisted by the program. This
paper also contributes to the understanding of the program to address the problem of low
permanent income. Unlike other welfare programs that addressing temporary income shocks,
the housing voucher program continuously subsidizes the needy family in the long-term,
which addressing the problem of low permanent income (Collinson et al., 2015). Constantly
subsidizing the families for the long-term is not optimal due to decreasing marginal utility
from providing additional money to the same families. Instead, proving modest subsidies to
a larger population will make low-income households better off.
This study is also relevant to the discussion about the subsidy to renting vs home-
ownership. Researchers and policymakers argue that housing vouchers are biased against
homeownership and call on a program reform that allows households to use vouchers for
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homeownership (Olsen, 2003; Olsen et al., 2007; Kingsley, 2017). My findings show that
housing vouchers are biased against homeownership and policy reforms that allow house-
holds to use vouchers to buy homes will promote homeownership and marriage among the
eligible households.
Last but not least, this paper contributes to the understanding of the difference between
transfer in kind and transfer in cash (Chan and Moffitt, 2018; Moffitt and Kosar, 2020), and
the importance of the targeting of the program. The results demonstrate that transfer in
cash will create larger disincentives for working than transfer in kind. Though transfer in
cash results in higher disincentives for working, households are better off if they are given
the equivalent cash transfer instead of housing subsidy as they can spend it either on goods
or housing, depending on the optimal choices. Moreover, The effect of the program depends
on the targeting of the program. The overall welfare will increase if the vouchers are only
given to low-productivity households or female-headed households.
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2.0 Boomerang College Kids: Coresidence and Job Mismatch
Joint with
Prof. Stefania Albanesi, University of Pittsburgh, Economics
Prof. Rania Gihleb, University of Pittsburgh, Economics
2.1 Introduction
Millennial college graduates have faced difficulties in finding economic security compared
to older generations due to more challenging labor market conditions. This can be clearly
seen in panel a) of Figure 4, which compares the unemployment rate at age 23 to 27 years
old for the 1996 and 2014 college graduation cohorts in the Panel of Survey of Income and
Program Participation. The average unemployment rate for this age group in the 1996 cohort
is 9% whereas it rises to 12% for the 2014 cohort. Additionally, an increasing fraction of
employed college graduates experience job mismatch, which we define as being employed in
a position that does not require a college degree.1 This can be seen in panel b) of Figure
4. The right panel shows that the job mismatch rate for the 2014 graduation cohort at age
23 to 27 years is around 52% on average, which is 7% higher than for the 1996 graduation
cohort at the same age. Moreover, college graduates in mismatched jobs earn substantially
less than their counterparts in matched jobs. As shown in Table 7, based on SIPP data, total
monthly earnings at a matched job are 12% higher than at mismatched jobs for the 1996
graduation cohort and 34% higher for the 2014 graduation cohort. Additionally, earnings in
mismatched jobs declined from $3,090 for the 1996 cohort to $2,854 for the 2014 cohort.
1To measure the job mismatch rate, we use the data from the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational
Information Network (O*NET). We use the following question from the O*NET Education and Training
Questionnaire to determine whether an occupation requires a college degree: “If someone were being hired to
perform this job, indicate the level of education that would be required.” We consider a college education to
be a requirement for a given occupation if at least 50 percent of the respondents working in that occupation
indicated that a bachelor’s degree is necessary to perform the job. We then merged these data on the educa-
tional requirements for each occupation with data from SIPP on individual workers and their occupations.
A college graduate is considered getting a mismatched job if he or she is working in an occupation that does
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Figure 4: Youth Labor Market Outcomes
Note: Unemployment rate and job mismatch rate for college graduates age 23-27 not enrolled in school. Col-
lege graduates hold bachelor’s degree. Data is drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(1996 and 2014) and Department of Labor, O*NET Education, Experience, Training.
College graduates have also been faced with increasing student debt burdens in addition
to adverse labor market conditions. The fraction of college graduates with student loans and
the average student loan balances have been increasing since the early 1990s, almost doubling
since then (see Figure 20). Specifically, for the 2014 graduation cohort, Table 7 shows that
the fraction with student loans is 41%, compared to 18% for the 1996 graduation cohort.
Conditional on having student debt, average balances were $25,091 for the 2014 graduation
cohort, an increase of $5,000 relative to the 1996 graduation cohort. The increase in both
fraction and amount of student loans resulted from the rise in college tuition and cost (Lucca
et al., 2018).
Many young college graduates, in response to mounting student debt and labor market
uncertainty, have chosen to move back to their parents’ home. Figure 5 shows that more
than 31% of the the 2014 college graduation cohort live with their parents at age 23 to
27 years old, compared to only 25% for the 1996 graduation cohort. The coresidence rate
declines with age, as do the unemployment rate and the job mismatch rate, shown in Figure
4, suggesting that as labor market outcomes improve, young college graduates are more likely
not typically require a bachelor’s degree.
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to live independently. While we focus on the 2014 graduation cohort in comparison to the
1996 cohort, the differences in outcomes for these two cohorts reflect systematic trends that
can be documented since at least the early 1990s. Figures 21 and 22 in Appendix A show
the evolution of the job mismatch rate and the coresidence rate for young college graduates
between 1990 and 2018, indicating a common countercyclical pattern for both variables. Our
choice of of the 1996 and 2014 graduation cohort is mainly driven by data availability and
limitations.2
Figure 5: Youth Coresidence Rate
Note: Coresidence rate for college graduates age 23-27 not enrolled in school. College graduates hold
bachelor’s degree. Data is drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (1996 and 2014).
Living with their parents allows young adults to smooth their consumption and help
them to search for a better-matched job in the labor market. Coresidence increases college
graduates’ outside option on the labor market, which increases their reservation wage and
allows them the opportunity to find a better-matched job than other college graduates com-
2The 2014 cohort is the most recent cohort for which panel data is available from the SIPP data, while
the 1996 cohort is the earliest panel for which we have the same complete information with 2014 cohorts.
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peting for the same jobs without this option. This initial advantage will likely cumulate
over the life cycle, as a better job match at the beginning of one’s career is associated with
higher earning growth (Barnichon and Zylberberg, 2019). Coresidence can therefore play an
important role in mitigating the adverse impact of worsening labor market conditions for
college graduates at the start of their career.
In this paper, we examine the joint determinants of coresidence and labor market out-
comes. We quantify the role of economic factors, such as family background, outstanding
student loan balances, job mismatch rate, wage dispersion, and rental costs, in accounting
for the differences in living arrangements, employment and wages between the 1996 and 2014
college graduation cohorts, using a structural model estimated using 2014 SIPP panel data.
The model centers around a dynamic game between parents and college children in which
coresidence status and labor market outcomes for the children are jointly determined as a
function of earnings, assets, and other family characteristics, as well as preferences. We find
that coresidence at the early career stage has important quantitative implications for college
graduates in terms of life time earnings. Using the estimated structural model, we decom-
pose the impact on changes in parental income, student debt burden, matched job arrival
rate, dispersion of offered wages, and rental costs. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that
these factors can jointly explain the 54% of the difference in matched job rates and 63% of
the difference in coresidence rates between the 1996 and 2014 college graduation cohorts. We
also find that changes in preferences over marriage and household formation are important
in shaping the evolution of coresidence behavior between the two graduation cohorts.
Our paper is related to the literature that studies the determinants of coresidence,
focussing on the effect of labor market shocks on coresidence outcomes (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1993, 1994; Wiemers, 2014; Bitler and Hoynes, 2015; Matsudaira, 2016). This re-
search shows that young workers experiencing negative employment and earnings shocks are
more likely to move back with their parents. In addition, Bleemer et al. (2014) and Dettling
and Hsu (2018) show that student debt is a big contributing factor to the increase in cores-
idence for the young in the United States. Moreover, a growing literature using European
data (Manacorda and Moretti, 2006; Giuliano et al., 2004), Asian data (Sakudo, 2007), and
American data (Kaplan, 2012) finds that preferences play an important role in determining
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coresidence behaviors. Marriage formation (White, 1994; Sakudo, 2007; Yu and Kuo, 2016),
housing costs (Ermisch, 1999; Guo et al., 2019; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2019) and public
benefits (Hoerger et al., 1996; Hu, 2001) also affect young people’s living arrangement with
parents.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the effect of coresidence on economic
outcomes. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) find that both shared residence and financial
transfers help sons smooth consumption. Moreover, they also find that an increase in wel-
fare benefits affects the provision of parental support in terms of transfers and coresidence
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994). Krolikowski et al. (2017) extend the idea of coresidence
by studying the effect of living in the same neighborhood as parents on earning recoveries.
They find that young people who live close to their parents experience stronger earnings
recoveries after a job displacement than those who live farther away.
Our paper contributes to these literatures by quantifying the dynamic impact of cores-
idence on college graduates’ ability to find a matched job and to their life cycle earning
potential. We also quantify the role of student debt and labor market conditions, such as
the availability of matched jobs and wage dispersion for college graduates, on coresidence
patterns. Finally, we examine the effect of family background and housing costs in the
joint determination of labor market outcomes and coresidence patterns for young college
graduates.
Our theoretical model builds on Kaplan (2012), who examines that the role of coresidence
as an insurance channel against labor market risk for high school graduates. We instead focus
on college graduates, since they have experienced a marked increase in coresidence in the
last twenty years, whereas coresidence rates have remained stable for high school graduates.
This can be seen in Figure 23, which plots the coresidence rate for the 2014 and 1996 college
graduation cohorts and for young adults in the same age range without a college degree.
Our focus is on the impact of increased student debt burdens and job match rates college
graduates on coresidence.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we show the suggestive evidence on
coresidence and job mismatch. Section 3 is the outlining of our structural model. The
identification and estimation of the model are presented in section 4. We conduct a series of
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counterfactual analysis in section 5. The conclusion is in the last section.
2.2 Data and Empirical Evidence
2.2.1 SIPP Data
Our data is drawn from the 2014 and 2018 Panel of Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). The 2014 Panel has 4 waves, covering from January 2013 to December
2016. The 2018 Panel has one wave, covering the entire year 2017. Each wave in both
panels used the previous 12-month as the reference period and tracks each individual of the
sampled households for the entire time span. The survey contains extensive information
on each youth’s labor market behavior and educational outcomes, together with detailed
information about family and community background. The SIPP (2014 and 2018) also
provides detailed individual and household assets and debt information.3
The 2014 SIPP is ideal to study the dynamics of parent-college graduates living ar-
rangements as it has detailed information on monthly coresidence, student debt, and labor
market outcomes, along with the large representative sample size. At each interview, the
survey asked respondents to list the father/mother household number if they are living to-
gether with them. It also asks whether the children move in/out of the parental house and
the number of family members in the household within that month. From these questions, it
is possible for us to construct a monthly panel of parental coresidence for each respondent.
Furthermore, the data also contains information on labor market outcomes and debt at the
times that coresidence transitions take place.
2.2.1.1 Sample
Our analysis focuses on college graduates who obtained their bachelor’s degrees in 2011-
2013. The graduates in those years are in the cohort born between 1990-1993 and face
3While we use both 2014 and 2018 SIPP panels, we sometimes refer to both as the “2014 SIPP panel”
for expositional ease moving forward.
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similar economic conditions at graduation, and we refer to them as the 2014 graduation
cohort. For comparison purposes, we also consider individuals who graduate in 1994-1996,
born in 1972-1976, who we refer to as the 1996 graduation cohort. For both cohorts, we
exclude individuals who pursue a postgraduate degree.4 Conditioning on the sample that
not attending graduate school allows us to focus on the interaction between residential status
and labor market outcomes. Additionally, graduate training may be a function of labor
market conditions at graduation and will also affect labor market outcomes. The final 2014
graduation cohort sample consists of 2,169 college graduates with 28,339 year-month-youth
observations. The detailed steps of sample selection are described in Table 37.
2.2.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
We find that among college graduates in the 2014 graduation cohort, nearly 36% co-reside
with their parents for at least one month during the sample period. The average duration
of time spent co-residing with their parents is 5 months. Additionally, approximately 6% of
individuals in this cohort co-resided with their parents for at least one month after initially
moving away.
The 2014 SIPP data contains detailed information on each category of assets and debt.
Financial assets include savings accounts, checking accounts, stocks, mutual funds, and
bonds.5 Debt includes student loans, credit card loans, and loans on stocks/funds. We
present assets and debt statistics for the 1996 and 2014 college cohort in Panel A of Table
7. For both cohorts of college graduates, student debt is the major component of their debt
and net assets. The share with student debt increased from 18% for the 1996 cohort to 41%
for the 2014 cohort. For those who have student loans, the average amount increase by 25%
from the 1996 cohort to the 2014 cohort. As the 2014 cohort has more student debt both
extensively and intensively, their net assets, which is defined as the total assets minus total
debt, are much lower than that for the 1996 cohort.
4In the 2014 SIPP sample, about 9% of the college graduates pursue a postgraduate degree.
5We do not consider mortgages as the share of college graduates with a mortgage is less than 10% in
earlier ages.
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Table 7: Assets and Earnings: SIPP 1996 VS 2014 College Cohort
1996 2014
Panel A: Assets and debt share amounts (> 0) share amounts (> 0)
Total assets 30% $4,845 60% $4,415
Total debt: 34% $10,502 52% $22,110
Student loans 18% $20,594 41% $25,091
Other debt 20% $2,847 27% $4,561
Net assets -$1,647 -$7,299
(total assets-total debt):
Panel B: Earnings
Matched job earnings $3,459 $3,837
Mismatched job earnings $3,090 $2,854
Note: Total assets include savings accounts, checking accounts, stocks, mutual funds, and bonds. Total
debts include student loans and other debts, where other debts include credit card loans and debt on stocks
or bonds. Net assets are defined as total assets minus total debts. Individual earnings in SIPP includes
wages and salary, nonfarm self-employment income, and farm self-employment income. All values reported




Since there is no parental transfer or completed parental income information included
in the SIPP,6 we turn to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to obtain information
on college graduates parental background. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a
nationally representative longitudinal study of the economic, health, family status, as well
as public and private support systems of older adults conducted every two years. The survey
has detailed information about older citizens’ income and their children’s education level,
which allows us to estimate the parental income for college graduates in our analysis. The
data also records the level of monetary transfers from parents to their adult children in each
calendar year. According to HRS (2014-2018), the average annual transfer from parents to
college graduates is $6,058. We will use the parental transfer data from HRS to proxy the
transfer in our sample.
2.2.3 Labor Market Outcomes and Coresidence
We now examine the relation between coresidence and labor market outcomes. We first
estimate the impact of labor market performance on coresidence in the short run. Addition-
ally, we examine the relation between coresidence and subsequent labor market performance
over a longer horizon. In both cases, we proxy labor market performance with employment,
having a matched job and earnings.
Table 8 shows the logit estimation results for the relation between coresidence and se-
lected contemporaneous labor market outcomes using the SIPP 2014 data. In particular, we
consider a dummy variable for whether an individual was working in a given month, a dummy
variable for whether they were employed in a mismatched job, and log monthly earnings.
For the models with mismatch and log earnings as the independent variable, the sample is
restricted to those employed. All specifications include a set of fixed and time-varying con-
trol variables including age, age square, age cubic, race, metro area, marital status, gender
fixed effect, and year fixed effect. We also control for lagged coresidence dummy to capture
6As with other household surveys, SIPP only reports parental income information if the parents and
youths are living in the same household.
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the mechanical effect of previous coresidence behavior.
Table 8: Labor Market Performance and Coresidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Log earnings -0.460*** -1.010***
(0.128) (0.274)
Includes fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,962 17,418 17,418 2,925 2,177 2,177
Individuals 2,008 1,632 1,632 2,21 199 199
Note: All estimates include controls for age, age square, age cubic, race, metro dummy, marital status,
lag of coresidence, and gender fixed effect as well as year fixed effect. Standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered by individuals. Parameters are multiplicative effects of probability of working, or marginal change
in earnings, on probability of living with parents. The sample is college graduates, who are 23-27 years old
between 2013-2017. Coresidence is a dummy variable that equals one if the college graduate lives with either
one of his/her parents or both during the reference month. Employed is a dummy variable that equals one
if the college graduate reported working during the reference month. Earnings are measured by the total
person’s earned income for the reference month, which includes wages and salary, nonfarm self-employment
income, and farm self-employment income. Log earnings are the logarithm of earnings. The first three
columns do not control for individual fixed effects and the last three columns control for individual fixed
effects.
Columns (1)-(3) show the regression result without control for individual fixed effects.
Column (1) shows that employed individuals are less likely to be living with their parents
than those who are not employed. The point estimate for the Logit model is -0.1, which
converts to a small average marginal effect of employment on coresidence at -0.001. Among
employed individuals, those who engage in a mismatched job are more likely to live with
their parents. The Logit point estimate at 0.67 is statistically significant at the 5% level,
converting to an average marginal effect of 0.03, which implies that mismatched college
graduates are 3% more likely to live with their parents on average. Moreover, individuals
with higher earnings are also less likely to live at home. The point estimate implies that
a 10% increase in earnings will decrease the probability of coresidence by 2%. To control
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for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with labor market outcomes, columns
(4)-(6) report results from an individual fixed-effects (conditional) Logit model. The main
results are consistent with the baseline specification but with a much larger average marginal
effect. For instance, the point estimate in column (5) implies that college graduates with
mismatched jobs are 5% more likely to live with their parents.
2.2.4 Long Run Effects of Coresidence
The evidence from the previous section suggests that improved labor market perfor-
mance is inversely related to coresidence over the short run. We now provide evidence that
coresidence is also important for long-term labor market outcomes. Particularly, we show
that unemployment and job mismatch have persistent negative effects on earnings for college
graduates. However, these negative effects are mitigated by coresidence and the ability to
move back with their parents after a job displacement or job mismatch. To illustrate this,
we look at becoming unemployed or being employed in a mismatched job after graduation
on future earnings. For most of the college graduates in our sample, we can observe earnings
up to age 27. Therefore, we regress log earnings at age 27 on an indicator variable for unem-
ployment or mismatched employment at age 23, which is the initial period we can observe
them.
The results are displayed in Table 9. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that unemployment
or job mismatch at age 23 can have a significant negative impact on future earnings. College
graduates who are unemployed or employed in a mismatched job at age 23 have earnings
at age 27 that are on average 37% lower than those who did not. In columns (2)-(3), we
divide the sample by coresidence status. Column (2) considers those who do not coreside
with their parents, whose earnings at age 27 are 44% lower, whereas, column (3) considers
those who were coresiding with their parents when unemployed or working in a mismatched
job, for whom the effect on earnings is much smaller. In columns (4) and (5), we further
divide the sample of college graduates who were not coresiding if unemployed of working in
a mismatched job, into those who moved back with their parents after this spell, and those
who did not, respectively. Column (4) considers the effect on earnings at age 27 for the first
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group, which is very small and not statistically different from zero. Column (5) considers
the effect on earnings at age 27 for the second group. Unemployment or employment at a
mismatched job at age 23 is associated with a 45% reduction in earnings at age 27 for this
group. Taken together, these results suggest that coresidence strongly reduces the negative
impact on earnings of early career unemployment or job mismatch.
Table 9: Long Run Impact of Job Mismatch and Coresidence
(1)a (2)b (3)c (4)d (5)e
Dependent Variable Log earnings at age 27
mismatch & unemployed -0.470*** -0.590*** -0.304*** 0 -0.602***
(0.0489) (0.0624) (0.0785) (0.032) (0.063)
Observations 1,680 1,044 636 36 1,008
Note: College graduates in 2014 SIPP panel. In particular, the sample for each column is: a: All employed
college graduates at age 23; b: All employed college graduates not coresiding at the time of mismatch or
unemployed at age 23; c: All employed college graduates coresiding at the time of mismatch or unemployed
at age 23; d: All employed college graduates not coresiding and who moved back with parents in after
mismatch or unemployement at age 23; e: All employed college graduates not coresiding and who did not
move back with parents after mismatch or unemployed at age 23.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
We now examine the joint determination of labor market outcomes and coresidence for
young college graduates through the lens of a structural model. The model examine the
causal relation between family background, student debt and other factors and coresidence
and labor market outcomes, and helps to model the long run implications of the rise in cores-
idence for college graduates. We also use the model to examine a number of counterfactuals
to quantify the impact of these factors.
The model, which builds on Kaplan (2012), is parsimonious but is rich enough to enable
estimation of the key parameters governing asset accumulation, coresidence, and labor mar-
ket status for young college graduates. The economy is populated by families consisting of a
parent/child pair, where children are assumed to be young college graduates. Parents have
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exogenous labor income and assets, while children face a frictional labor market. They can
be unemployed or employed at a matched or mismatched job. A matched job, is interpreted
as corresponding to one that requires a college degree. Wages at matched jobs are higher
and grow over time. The arrival rate for matched jobs is higher than for a mismatched job,
so there is option value to waiting for a matched job. Parents can provide their children
support via monetary transfers or coresidence. Children and parents engage in negotiations
to determine whether the child will coreside with their parent or live independently. Parents
care about their children’s welfare via a warm glow motive. Both parents and children prefer
to live independently.
2.3.1 Environment
The economy is populated by families who live for t = 0, 1, ...T periods, where the unit
of time is a month. A family consists of a college graduate and his/her parents. Families
are indexed by i, an adult parent is indexed by p, and a college child is indexed by c. In any
given period t, the child can be in either one of two residence status rit ∈ {0, 1}. If rit = 0,
the child lives with his/her parents, else if rit = 1, the child lives independently.
2.3.1.1 Children’s Preferences
The child’s utility is defined over consumption, work, and living arrangement, with period
utility additively separable across these three states. Children obtain utility from two types
of consumption goods: cy is the private good, consumed exclusively by them; G is the total
public good inside the family. It consists of the youth’s own purchase of the good, gy, as
well as a public good provided by the parent, gp. The public good provided by parents is
only available inside the parental home and the youth can only get access to it if he lives
with the parent, with:
Git = g
y
it + (1− rit)g
p
it









− hitv + ritzit (2)
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where hit denotes work status, working if h = 1, or not working, if h = 0. The disutility of
working is fixed at v.
Utility over the two types of consumption good takes a Cobb-Douglas specification, with
the parameter φ indexing the weight of the public good in total consumption. For φ = 1,
only public goods are consumed and there are full economies of scale, while with φ = 0, all
consumption is private. The preference for living away from home is captured by the shock
zit, which follows an AR(1) process, with zit = E[zt] + ρzzi,t−1 + εit where εt ∼ Â N(0, σ2z).
The mean preference for living away from home, E[zt] = αz + γzt, is allowed to increase
linearly with age. The parameter γz is estimated to be positive, which captures the fact that
more youths will live away from home as they get older. The autocorrelation coefficient ρz
and the variance σ2z do not depend on age. The preference shocks capture the effect of non-
economic heterogeneity, especially taste for independence, on college graduate coresidence
behavior.
A child’s lifetime utility is given by:





where V yT+1 is a terminal value function.
2.3.1.2 Parent’s Preference
Parents derive utility from their own private consumption, cp, and public consumption










Parents are altruistic towards their children, so the parents’ overall value is given by their
value from consumption and the children’s value weighted by altruism factor η.








T+1V pT+1 + ηV
y
0 (5)
In the model, we assume that parents do not derive utility from the public good purchased
by the children when the children live at home, so that the intergenerational link between
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parent and child works through the parent’s altruism. Because parents are altruistic towards
their children, they have an incentive to provide income transfers to their children, enabling
them to have more resources and to live on their own. In addition, parents do not have a
direct preference for coresidence but they have an indirect preference over the residential
state because they care about their children’s welfare. Since η < 1, parents have a weaker
preference for their children’s independence than their children’s.
2.3.1.3 Budget Constraints
In each period, children can be employed or unemployed. If employed, they earn a
monthly wage of wit, which is a stochastic process depending on their type of job. The labor
income will be taxed according to the tax function τ .7 If the child is not employed, they will
receive an unemployment benefit, b.
Children use their income to purchase consumption, cyit and g
y
it. In addition, they ac-
cumulate net savings, denoted with ait+1, with a gross rate of return R.
8 Children start
their life in the model with an exogenously assigned level of net savings drawn from the net
asset distribution from SIPP data, which mainly reflects variation in student loan balances.
Children cannot borrow during the course of their lives, so if they start with negative net
savings, their level of debt can only fall over the course of their life. Children can also receive
a transfer Tit from their parents. For children who do not coreside, there is a per period
fixed cost of housing, χ. If the children were coresiding last period and move out this period,
they will incur a one period moving cost κ. The moving cost includes time and monetary
costs. We assume there are no costs associated with moving back to their parents’ home.
Therefore, a college graduate’s budget constraint is given by:
cyit + g
y
it + ai,t+1 + rit[χ+ (1− rit)κ] ≤ (1− τ)withit + b(1− hit) +Rait + Tit (6)
Parents’ income Ipi , is exogenously given and differs across families. Parents can use
their income for private good purchases, cpit, public good purchases, g
p
it, housing cost χ, and
7The tax function is constructed based on the US tax system in 2014.
8Since for young college graduates in the data most of their net savings correspond to student loan
balances, we use the federal student loan interest rate for R, which annualized was 4.66% in 2014.
59
making transfers to their children, Tit. Hence the parents budget constraint is given by:
cpit + g
p




The model makes three key assumptions about access to asset markets and transfers
between parents and children. First, parents cannot save or borrow. This is mainly a
simplifying assumption to reduce the computational burden associated with solving the
model, stemming from imperfect altruism for the parents and the lack of commitment in
the relation between children and parents.9 The key implication of this assumption is that
it forces the parents to face a trade-off between making a transfer to children and their own
consumption. If we allow parents to hold assets, they could smooth their consumption over
time through assets. By ruling out parental savings, we limit the extent to which parents can
use a financial transfer to offset the effect of labor market shocks to the youth. This makes
coresidence a more attractive way of intergenerational resource sharing. Second, we assume
that children cannot borrow, though they may start their lives with negative net assets,
reflecting outstanding student loans. This assumption reflects limited access to consumer
credit, other than educational loans, for young borrowers.
Finally, we assume that children don’t make transfers to parents or pay housing costs
and services when living at home. This assumption is based on empirical evidence. The
SIPP data provide information about who pays the household rent and how much they paid.
It shows that when college graduates live with their parents, only 0.5% of them contribute to
part of the rent cost. The low contribution is because most of the parents (85%) own their
homes rather than rent their homes. Even for the rest who rent the house, children rarely
share rent costs when living with parents. To check whether children contribute to public
good consumption, we turn to the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH),
which contains information about cost-sharing within families. We focus on the most recent
wave of NSFH which is the 2001-2002 wave. Focusing on the subset of youth with a college
degree and aged 21-28, we found that 18% of the sample contributes something to the
9See Barczyk and Kredler (2014a,b) for a full discussion of the issues.
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household and the average contribution is $212. Therefore, about 80% of youth doesn’t
make contributions to households, and among those who made contributions, the amount is
very small.
2.3.2 Labor Market
Young college graduates can be unemployed (U), working in a matched job (MA), or
working in a mismatched job (MI). A matched job is interpreted as corresponding to one in
which a college degree is required, while a mismatched job is one in which a college degree is
not required. Mismatched jobs pay lower earnings and can also be performed by those with
only a high school education. There is no on-the-job search. Each period an unemployed
individual receives one job offer of type j ∈ {MA,MI} with probability λj, which he/she can
accept or reject. The wage offers are drawn from the job type specific lognormal distribution:
wj ∼ N(µj0, σ
j
0)
Since the mean wage of matched jobs is higher than that of mismatched jobs, waiting
for a matched job is beneficial. In addition, the job, regardless of the type, is exogenously
destroyed with probability δ in each period.
Let V U , V MA, and V MI denote the value of being unemployed, working in a matched
job, and working a mismatched job. The values depend on youths’ state variables (Ω) which
include wage offers (w), preference for coresidence (z), assets (a), and parents’ transfer (T ).
The value of being unemployed is:
V U(Ω) = u(b) + βE{max{λMA
∫ ∞
0




V MI(Ω′)dFMI , VU(Ω
′)}}
where b is unemployment benefits, λMA and λMI are arrival rates of matched and mismatched
jobs. The terms FMA and FMI are wage distributions for matched and mismatched jobs.
The expectation E is taken over the next period distribution of coresidence taste (z′). The
values of working in a matched or mismatched job are:




′) + δV U(Ω′), V U(Ω′)}}
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′) + δV U(Ω′), V U(Ω′)}}
A youth who receives a wage offer of job type j will accept it if his/her value of accepting
the offer is larger than the value of being unemployed and keeping search.
Given that the state variables (w, z, a, T ) change over time, a youth working in a mis-
matched job or a low wage matched job may quit their jobs, become unemployed and search
for a new job in the following circumstances: 1) he/she becomes less averse to moving back
home; 2) he/she pays off student loans; 3) his/her parents provide more transfers; 4) he/she
experiences negative shocks to current wages. In particular, a youth will reject or quit
working in a matched (or mismatched) job if V U(Ω) > V MA(Ω) (or V U(Ω) > V MI(Ω)).
After an initial wage draw, the wage process for individual i working in job type j at
time t evolves as:
logwijt = θt + log jobijt
Where θt is the experience effect that is common for everyone regardless of job types. The
term log jobijt is the job type-dependent component.
If it’s a matched job (j = MA),
log jobijt = µd + log jobijt−1 + εijt
where the term µd is estimated to be positive, reflecting on the job wage growth for matched
jobs. The term εijt ∼ N(0, σ2j ) is i.i.d, capturing job-type specific shocks to current wages.
If it’s a mismatched job (j = MI),
log jobijt = log jobijt−1 + εijt
The difference between a matched and mismatched job is that: 1) the initial wage offer
distribution of a matched job is different than that for a mismatched job. Matched jobs
have a higher mean of initial wage offers; 2) a matched job features trend growth (µd) in
addition to growth related to the accumulation of on the job experience by the individual
worker; while the wage growth for a mismatched job only only reflects individual experience
effect. The trend growth in matched job wages is assumed to reflect economywide skill biased
technological change.
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In this environment, the ability to coreside with their parents for young college graduates
may have long-run effects on labor market outcomes. Specifically, there is an option value
of waiting for a matched job offer, so those who can wait longer for jobs are more likely
to obtain a matched job offer. Children with higher value of unemployment will be more
likely to reject a mismatch job offer and wait for the arrival of a matched job. The ability to
coreside with their parents or higher parental transfers increase the value of unemployment
for youth.
2.3.3 Initial Conditions and Terminal Values
Closing the model requires specifying a set of initial and terminal conditions. The initial
age t = 0 corresponds to 21-22. Initial assets a0 are drawn from the empirical distribution of
net worth at age 21-22 in SIPP data, corresponding to Jan 2013. Additionally, we assume
that an exogenous fraction of agents at t = 0 is living at home, corresponding to the empirical
value in Jan 2013. Similarly, an exogenous fraction of these individuals are assumed to be
working at t = 0, to match the corresponding empirical value in Jan 2013. The initial
fraction employed in matched and mismatched jobs is also taken directly from the data.
Their wages are given by the empirical distribution of monthly wages for that age group
conditional on type of job.
Following Kaplan (2012), we set the terminal age to 30 years old, which corresponds to
T = 90 given that the model is monthly. At the terminal period, all interaction between par-
ents and children ceases. There is no coresidence happening and children have to move out of
their parents’ home. Additionally, parents stop making financial transfers. Children’s labor
supply becomes inelastic and there is no uncertainty about future earnings, corresponding
to the assumptions we make for parents. The above assumptions and specifications allow us
to obtain closed-form solutions for the terminal value functions.
2.3.4 Feasible Allocations and Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
Given housing cost (χ) and interest rates (R), an allocation is a mapping of labor market
outcomes and preference shocks {wt, jt, zt}, initial conditions {a0, w0, h0, j0, r0}, and parental
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t , Tt, at+1}. An allocation is feasible if it satisfies
both the parental and the children’s budget constraint (6) and (7), and the non negativity
constraints for transfers, net assets, and consumption.
We specify the order in which children and parents make decisions to guarantee the
uniqueness of the equilibrium household allocation. This sequence can be interpreted as a
subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential game played by the children and their parents,
in which at every stage, the players take into account the optimal response of the other
players in the subsequent stages. The sequence of choices is as follows. In stage 1, given
the state variables, children make their residence decisions. In stage 2, parents will take the
children’s residence choice as given and make their transfer and consumption decisions. In
the third stage, children will make their work, assets, and consumption decisions given the
choices made by their parents in the previous stage. The timing of actions is summarized in
Table 10.
Table 10: Stages of the Game
Stage State variables Choice By whom
1 (at, rt−1, wt, jt, zt) rt Children





3 (at, rt−1, rt, wt, jt, zt, Tt, g
p





Based on these timing assumptions, an equilibrium allocation is a feasible allocation such
that: (1) given the prices {χ,R}, labor market shocks {wt, jt}, preference shocks, zt, college
graduates choose their living arrangement rt to maximize their lifetime utility; (2) given
children’s optimal residence decisions and their states, parents choose {Tt, cpt , g
p
t } to maxi-
mize their lifetime utility; (3) given parents’ transfer and public good consumption {Tt, gpt },
children choose asset holdings, working and consumption {at+1, ht, cyt , g
y
t } to maximize their
lifetime utility.
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2.3.5 Factors Affecting Coresidence
There are four state variables that affect living arrangements in equilibrium. The first
is earnings, which are determined by employment status and job quality. The second is net
assets. The third is the realized value of the preference for living independently, and the last
is parental income. Children are more likely to live independently if their labor earnings,
net assets, or value of independence are high. However, the effect of parental income on
living away is ambiguous. On the one hand, if parents are wealthy, they can provide higher
transfers to the children, which makes living independently an attractive option. On the
other hand, wealthy parents are more likely to provide higher levels of household public
good consumption, which increases the value of coresidence for the children.
2.4 Estimation
Our strategy for parameterizing the model is to identify a small set of parameters that
can be obtained from independent evidence, which we refer to as calibrated parameters,
and to rely on structural estimation for most of the key parameters. We adopt a Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) approach, based on simulating the theoretical moments and
minimizing the difference between simulated moments and data moments, weighted by the
variance-covariance matrix of the data moments.
2.4.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters
The value and reference of the externally estimated parameters are reported in Table 26.
Parents and children are assumed to have a coefficient of relative risk aversion parameter of
γ = 1.5. The annualized discount factor is β = 0.96 annualized with a corresponding monthly
value of β = 0.996. Since for most young college graduates, net assets are negative and are
comprised mainly of educational loans, we set the interest rate equal to the Stafford loan
interest rate, which is 4.66% annualized, or 0.4% monthly. We derive the unemployment
benefit as the mean of unemployment benefits for unemployed youth sample from SIPP
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data, for which the mean is about $600 per unemployment month for college graduates.
The parental income distribution is estimated from the HRS data. It is discretized into a
four-point grid, reflecting average parental income in each quartile of the distribution. The
share of public goods consumption in utility φ is set to be 0.3 following Kaplan (2012). We
obtain the monthly housing cost χ from the median gross rent between 2013 and 2017 drawn
from US Census, which is $1, 062. The fixed cost of moving κ is set equal to half month
housing cost, which is $500.10
Table 11: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value Reference
γ Risk aversion 1.5 Attanasio et al. (2008)
β Monthly discount factor 0.996 Prescott (1986)
R Monthly interest rate 1.004 Student debt interest rate (2014)
b Unemployment benefits $600 SIPP (2014)
Ip Parental income dist. [3566,5562,7449,9749] HRS (2014-2018)
φ Share of public goods 0.3 Kaplan (2012)
χ Housing cost $1,062 US Census (2013-2017)
κ Moving out cost $500
2.4.2 Internally Estimated Parameters
The approach to estimating the remaining parameters is simulated method of moments
(SMM). We choose a set of moments related to labor market outcomes, coresidence, net
assets, and parental transfers over the age range from 23-27 to identify all the parameters.
The full set of moments is shown in Table 38. The estimated parameters include labor






0 , σMA, σMI , µθ, µd); parameters govern-
ing coresidence preference (αz, γz, σ
2
z , ρz), altruism η, and disutility of working ν. Since the
number of moments is larger than the number of parameters, our model is over-identified.
Although all of the moments are used to estimate all of the parameters, there are certain
moments that are especially important to identify certain parameters. We provide a heuristic
argument for how each of the parameters can be identified from a subset of the moments
and give the intuition for identification.
10See Appendix B for more details.
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For the labor market parameters, a typical identification challenge arises as a result of
the fact that rejected job offers are not observed. Therefore, the labor market parameters
are estimated within the model. The job destruction rate δ is identified from the proba-
bility of not working, conditional on working in the previous month. We assume the job
destruction rate is the same for a matched job and mismatched job. Moreover, the identifi-
cation for parameters relevant to matched vs mismatched jobs is quite intuitive as we have
the corresponding data analog. The arrival rate of matched jobs λMA is identified from the
probability of working in a matched job, conditional on not working in the previous month
and the proportion of college graduates with a matched job. The arrival rate of mismatched
jobs λMI is identified from the probability of working in a mismatched job, conditional on
not working in the previous month. The mean and standard deviation of the initial wage
distribution of matched jobs (µMA0 , σ
MA
0 ) are identified from the mean and standard devia-
tion of the log entry earnings of matched job. Similarly, the mean and standard deviation of
the initial wage distribution of mismatched jobs (µMI0 , σ
MI
0 ) are identified from the mean and
standard deviation of the log entry earnings of mismatched job. The experience effect µθ is
identified from the mean growth of mismatched job earnings, as the only source of growth
for a mismatched job is experience effect. Conditional on the experience effect, the matched
job growth µd is pinned down by the mean growth of matched job earnings, as a matched job
has earning growth in addition to the experience effect. The standard deviation of matched
(mismatched) job earning shocks, σMA (σMI) is identified from the standard deviation of
matched (mismatched) job earnings conditional on working for more than two consecutive
periods. Conditional on the values for labor market parameters, the disutility of working ν
is pinned down by the average unemployment rate.
For the parameters governing coresidence, the average proportion of college graduates
living independently and the increase by age contributes to pin down the intercept and slope
in the mean utility of living independently (αz, γz). The average difference in earnings
between children living independently and children coresiding helps determine the variance
of preference shocks σ2z , which measures the cross-sectional heterogeneity in taste for living
independently. To shed light on the intuition of the identification, suppose that there was no
preference heterogeneity among children σ2z = 0, we would expect to see that all coresidence
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dynamics are driven by economic factors like earnings, assets, and housing costs. This
would imply that children living away from home have far higher earnings than children
living at home. As σ2z increases, the amount of non-labor market heterogeneity increases.
The heterogeneity reduces the variation of earnings across children who live independently
and those who coreside. Based on the variation in observed earnings by residence status,
heterogeneity in the value of independence is necessary to match the data.
The within-person time-series variation in parental coresidence pins down the persistence
of the preference parameter ρz. In particular, we use the monthly autocorrelation of coresi-
dence, the fraction of youth who ever move back with their parents, and the mean duration of
the coresidence period. It is important to have the last moment because the extent to which
duration of coresidence is different than duration in response to labor market shocks helps
determine the role of preferences. Suppose a case in which there is no time-series variation
in z. In this case, the duration of a coresidence spell for college graduates who experience a
labor market shock will be similar to the duration of the shock itself, such as the duration
of an unemployment spell or of employment at a mismatched job. Finally, parental altruism
is identified by the average transfer from parents to children in a given year, as the optimal
transfer decision is directly affected by the weight that parents put on the utility of children.
The estimated parameters are displayed in Table 12. We demonstrate the implication
of the sign and magnitude of parameters governing coresidence. The linear growth rate of
preference γz captures the growing preference for living independently as children get older.
The point estimate for γz is 0.07, which shows that as college graduates getting older, they
prefer living independently more and more. The autocorrelation ρz is estimated to be 0.85,
implying high persistence in the preference for coresidence despite the large cross-sectional
heterogeneity in this shock σ2z = 6.25.
2.4.3 Model Fit
The fit of the model for selected labor market moments is displayed in Figure 6. The
unemployment rate is shown in panel (a). The blue line is the average fraction not working
for age 23-27 simulated from the model, while the red line corresponds to the same statistic
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Table 12: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Estimate Standard error
Labor Market
δ Job destruction rate 0.03 0.01
λMA Match job arrival rate 0.53 0.13
λMI Mismatch job arrival rate 0.44 0.09
µMA0 Mean matched job log wage offer 7.52 2.1
µMI0 Mean mismatched job log wage offer 7.35 2.1
σMA0 SD matched job log wage offer 0.51 0.22
σMI0 SD mismatched job log wage offer 0.51 0.24
σMA SD of matched job wage shocks 0.04 0.01
σMI SD of mismatched job wage shocks 0.06 0.01
µθ Growth log experience effect 0.074 0.02
µd Matched job earning growth 0.042 0.01
Preference
αz Intercept mean value of living away 0.72 0.31
γz Age slope mean value of living away 0.07 0.02
σz variance of value of living away 6.25 0.22
ρz Autocorrelation of value of living away 0.85 0.22
η Altruism factor 0.04 0.02
ν Disutility of working 2.9 0.57
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calculated from SIPP data in years 2013-2017. The fraction of college graduates with a
matched job for the same age group is displayed in panel (b). We can see that our model
matches the trend and level of unemployment and job match rate for the cohort closely.
Panels (c) and (d) display the comparison of data and model for matched and mismatched
job earnings. We can see that the model can replicate the data very well.
Figure 6: Model Fit
Note: Model fit for labor market moments. Solid red lines correspond to the data; solid blue line correspond
to the model; dotted lines are 95% confidence interval for data. Variables are (a) fraction not working; (b)
fraction working in a matched job (c) matched job log earnings; (d) mismatched job log earnings.
The fit for coresidence moments is displayed in Figure 7. The fraction of college graduates
living independently is shown in panel (a). Our model can match the level and variation
with age of this statistic very well. The fraction of children ever coresiding with their
parents is shown in panel (b). The data indicate that children’s coresidence rates decline
with age from 5% at age 23 to around 2% at age 27. This trend is mostly captured by the
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Figure 7: Model Fit
Note: Model fit for coresidence moments. Solid red lines correspond to the data; solid blue line correspond to 
the model; dotted lines are 95% confidence interval for data. Variables are (a) fraction living away; (b) fraction 
ever move back; (c) mean duration back home; (d) away home log earning difference; (e) average transfer; (f) 
average stock of net assets (total assets-total debt).
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model though it over predicts the fraction coresiding at each age. Panel (c) shows the mean
duration back home, which is decreasing from 5 months to 2 months. The earnings difference
between children living independently and those coresiding is displayed in panel (d). Children
living independently have approximately 15% higher earnings than those coresiding, and this
difference decreases and then increases over age. The positive earning difference indicates
that those living independently are positively selected relative to those who coreside with
their parents. Our model predicts a positive earning difference and matches the data in
trend and level. Transfers from parents are shown in panel (e). Parents transfer less as their
children grow older. In our model, parents’ transfer has the same trend but it decreases at
a slower speed than the data. Finally, children’s stock of net assets is shown in panel (f).
College graduates pay off their debt as they aging. Between age 23-27, they close their debt
by $5,000 so their net assets, defined as total assets-total debt, increase by the same amount
accordingly.
2.4.4 Model Validation
There are several salient moments that are not targeted in the estimation that we examine
to validate the model and assess its mechanisms. These include the fraction of college
graduates with a matched job by residence status and mean net assets by residence status.
The comparison between data and model is shown in Table 13. The model predicts that
college graduates coresiding with their parents are less likely to have a matched job. College
graduates with higher debt are more likely to live with parents. The model replicates the
trend in the data very well.
2.5 Understanding Changes in Coresidence Over Time
Given the model and the parameter estimates, we can explore which factors led to the
changes in college graduates’ labor market outcomes and coresidence patterns for the 1996
and 2014 graduation cohorts. The goal of this section is to quantify the role of each of the
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Table 13: Model Validation
Model Data 95% CI
Fraction with matched job
Independent 0.53 0.52 (0.51, 0.53)
Coresiding 0.49 0.45 (0.44, 0.46)
Net assets
Independent -6,449 -6,227 (-7,363, -5,090)
Coresiding -7,506 -9,621 (-10,175, -9,067)
main channels individually and the combined effects of all channels.
2.5.1 Parental Income
Parental income is one of the major channels that affect coresidence behavior and la-
bor market outcomes. The major change in the parental income of college graduates from
1996 to 2014 is that more college graduates have lower parental income in 2014 graduation
cohort. The distribution of parental income for the 2014 graduation cohort is estimated
from HRS (2014-2018) as equal probability multinomial distribution over the support [3,066
5,562 7,449 9,749] in 2014 USD. To be consistent, the parental income distribution in 1996
is also estimated to be a four-point distribution with equal probability. After adjusting for
inflation, the support for the distribution of parental income in 1996 is [3,628 5,658 7,566
10,343] is 2014 USD. Thus, the parental income of college graduates in 1996 is 5.3% higher
than in 2014 on average. As a result of higher parental income for 1996 cohort, data shows
that the parental transfers for the 1996 cohort also 5% higher than that for the 2014 cohort.
We change the parental income from the 2014 to the 1996 distribution and display the
corresponding counterfactual outcomes in column (2) of Table 14. With higher parental
income, the average transfers rise by 1%, which closes the transfer gap between the two
cohorts by 20%. We do not detect any significant impact of the parental income change on
other outcomes.
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2.5.2 Student Loans Distribution
As our model predicts, the level of net assets significantly affects the coresidence and
labor market outcomes of college graduates. Since the major component of net assets is
student debt, we consider the change in student loans for college graduates between 1996
and 2014 and how this change affects their outcomes. The fraction of college graduates with
student debt and the average amount of debt rises sharply after 2000. This is mostly due
to the rise in tuition and fees associated with attending college, as argued by (Lucca et al.,
2018). For the 2014 graduation cohort, the fraction of college graduates with student loans
is 41%. Conditional on having student loans, the average amount of student debt is $25,901
(in 2014 USD). The corresponding values are much lower for the 1996 graduation cohort.
The fraction of college graduates with student loans is 18% and the average amount for those
who have student debt is $20,594 (in 2014 USD). As a result of student debt difference, the
average net assets (total assets-total debt) for the 2014 graduation cohort is much lower
(-$7,299 in 2014 USD), compared to the 1996 graduation cohort (-$1,647 in 2014 USD), as
previously shown in Table 7.
When we change the initial net assets distribution (at age 21-22 and model period t = 0)
of college graduates from the 2014 values to inflation adjusted 1996 values, the counterfactual
outcome is shown in column (3) of Table 14. With lower student debt or higher net assets,
the share of college graduates living independently increases by 1 percentage point or 2%.
Given the coresidence rate gap between the two college cohorts is 9%, the higher net assets
contribute to closing the gap by 22%. Due to the change in the initial distribution of net
assets, the asset gap between the two cohorts is mechanically closed.
2.5.3 Matched Job Arrival Rates
In the model, obtaining a matched job is important for college graduates’ welfare because
a matched job has a much higher wage. The labor market environment determines the
fraction of college graduates getting a matched job. For the 1996 graduation cohort, the
fraction in a matched job is 55% while only 48% for the 2014 cohort. This difference is
driven by variation in the arrival rates for matched and mismatched jobs for the two cohorts.
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To simulate this change, we set the matched job arrival rate so that the fraction of college
graduates in a matched job is the same as in the data for the 1996 graduation cohort. In
the estimated model, the job arrival rate for a matched job is 0.53 and a mismatched job
is 0.44 in 2014. The corresponding values for the 1996 graduation cohort are 0.55 and 0.42,
respectively. This experiment allows us to examine how the change in the matched job
arrival rate accounts for the change in outcomes across the two cohorts.
The result of this counterfactual experiment is shown in column (4) of Table 14. Because
the matched job arrival rate is higher, the unemployment rate drops by 1 percentage points
or 9%, which helps close the unemployment data gap by 36%.
2.5.4 Wage Offers
Wage dispersion has risen consistently for workers with a college degree. Autor et al.
(2005) documents the rise in wage dispersion since 1990, and how this increase has been
more pronounced for more experienced and educated workers. Consistent with Autor et al.
(2005), we find that the wage dispersion for college graduates rise for the 2014 graduation
cohort, compared to the 1996 cohort. The standard deviation of monthly earnings is $2,577
for college graduates with a mismatched job and $3,126 with a matched job in the 2014
graduation cohort. The corresponding inflation adjusted values for the 1996 graduation
cohort are $1,948 for those with a mismatched job and $2,153 for those with a matched job,
which implies an increase of 32% and 45% for mismatched and matched jobs across cohorts,
respectively.
To assess the role of rising wage dispersion, we set the standard deviation of log wage
offers for match and mismatched jobs to their values for the 1996 cohort. The result is
shown in column (5) of Table 14. The unemployment rate decreases from 11% to 9% in the
counterfactual, as the probability of a low wage offer declines in both match and mismatched
jobs. The decrease in wage dispersion contributes to closing the unemployment gap between
the two cohorts by 72%. Moreover, the fraction of college graduates living independently
rises from 69% to 71%, which helps to close the gap between the two cohorts by 33%.
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2.5.5 Rent
Another important change across the 1996 to 2014 college graduation cohorts is rental
costs. According to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the average rent, the main housing
cost for college graduates, increased 20% in real terms from 1996 to 2014. To quantify the
role of this change, we decrease rent to the 1996 inflation adjusted value.
The result is shown in the last column of Table 14. Intuitively, with a lower housing cost,
more college graduates are living independently, with a rise in the corresponding fraction
from 69% to 71%, closing the gap between the two graduation cohorts in this outcome by
33%. At the same time, fewer college graduates are unemployed and parental transfers are
correspondingly lower. Setting rental cost to its 1996 value closes the gap in unemployment
rates across the 2014 and 1996 graduation cohorts by 72%.
2.5.6 Combined Effects
In this section, we examine the combined effects of all the channels explored individually
above. The combined channels may have a different impact than each individual channel
because of offsetting interactions. The results from this combined counterfactual are shown
in Table 15. From the table, we can see that the fraction unemployed decreases by 25% from
the 2014 to 1996 graduation cohort in the data, and the combined channels predicted a 27%
decrease, which accounts for all of such change. The fraction with a matched job increases
by 15% from the 2014 to 1996 cohort in the data and the combined channels account for 54%
of this variation. The fraction living independently is 9% higher in 1996 and the channels
in the model account jointly for 63% of the overall change. Net asset accumulation over the
course of their life span is 77% higher for the 1996 graduation cohort and our channels can
account for all of that change. Finally, parental transfers do not experience large variation
over the period and our joint channels also predict no change of parental transfers for the
two cohorts.
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Table 14: Counterfactual Experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data Parents’ income Asset dist MA arrival Wage dispersion Rent
Fraction not working
2014 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
1996 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.09
% change 25% 0 0 9% 18% 18%
close the gap by 0 0 36% 72% 72%
Fraction with matched job
2014 0.48 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1996 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.49 0.49
% change 15% 0 0 10% -2% -2%
close the gap by 0 0 67% 0 0
Fraction living independently
2014 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
1996 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.71
% change 9% 0 2% 0 3% 3%
close the gap by 0 22% 0 33% 33%
Net assets
2014 -7,299 -7,259 -7,259 -7,259 -7,259 -7,259
1996 -1,647 -7,323 -41 -7,264 -7,225 -7,354
% change 77% 0 99% 0 0 0
close the gap by 0 128% 0 0 0
Parental transfers
2014 6,058 5,187 5,187 5,187 5,187 5,187
1996 6,336 5,224 5,139 5,195 5,076 5,053
% change 5% 1% 0 0 -2% -2%
close the gap by 20% 0 0 -40% -40%
Note: This table presents counterfactual experiments when considering each of the economic factors: parental
income, initial student loans, matched job arrival rate, mean and standard deviation of earnings for matched
and mismatched jobs, and housing cost (rent). Column (1) shows the data moments and percent change
between 2014 and 1996 college graduation cohorts. Columns (2)-(6) show the model simulation by turning
each of the economic factors from the 2014 scenario into the 1996 scenario. For each of the moment we
considered, the row “2014” represents the data or model simulation for 2014 college graduation cohorts. The
row “1996” represents the data or model simulation by changing each of the factors from 2014 into the 1996
scenario. The row “% change” represents the gap in percentage between 2014 and 1996 college cohorts.
The row “Close the gap by” represents the share that each of the economic factors can account for the gap
between 2014 and 1996 college cohorts.
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Table 15: Combined Counterfactuals
Data % change Counterfactuals 1-5 Closing the gap by
Fraction unemployed 25% 27% 100%
Fraction with matched job 15% 8% 54%
Fraction independent 9% 5.7% 63%
Net Assets 77% 95% 100%
Parental transfer 5% -3% 0
2.5.7 Taste for Independence
Our model implies that coresidence is driven by economic factors, such as net assets, job
offer arrival rates, wages, parental income, as well as a preference for independence, captured
by the preference shock z. The estimated model implies that 63% of the residence behavior
is driven by economic factors, while the rest 37% is due to the taste for independence. This
preference shock, however, not only captures the strength of preferences for independence,
but also additional economic factors that are not included in our model. A key factor driving
a preference for independence is the wish to marry or live with a romantic companion (White,
1994; Sakudo, 2007; Yu and Kuo, 2016), and variation in preferences over marriage may also
be driving changes in coresidence rates across the 1996 and 2014 cohorts of college graduates.
Figure 12 compares marriage rates for these two groups, and clearly shows lower marriage
rates for the 2014 graduation cohort compared to the 1996 cohort. The average marriage
rate for the college graduates in the 1996 graduation cohorts is 35% at age 23-27, while it
is only 19% for the 2014 cohort. Changes in attitudes towards marriage across these two
cohorts in our model are captured in the preference for independence shock.
Other underlying cultural factors influencing the taste for independence also may be
changing over time. For example, (DePaulo, 2016) shows that parents of millennials have
changed their parenting style and values have changed making it more acceptable for parents
to support adult children directly and reducing the stigma associated with coresidence.
We also examine the characteristics of parents for the two cohorts, other than economic
factors such as income, to identify other factors that may contribute to the change in cores-
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Figure 8: College Graduates Marriage Rate
Note: Young college graduates are those aged 23 to 27 with a bachelor’s degree or higher. All figures exclude
those currently enrolled in school. Data is drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
2014 and 1996 panels.
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idence rates. For instance, if the parents of 2014 graduation cohorts are more likely to live
in metropolitan areas, where there is a higher concentration of matched jobs, that would
provide a greater benefit from coresidence for the 2014 graduation cohort. However, we do
not find substantial differences in the fraction of parents living in the metro area for 1996
and 2014 graduation cohorts.
To interpret the strength of the taste for independence in the model and therefore its
role in explaining changes in coresidence rates across the 1996 and 2014 college graduation
cohorts, we assess the economic role of the taste for independence by calculating its monetary
value. To do so, we construct a counterfactual in which we first adjust the parameters that
govern preferences for independence, the mean value of the taste for living independently
and the slope of its relation to age (αz, γz), to value that imply our estimated model can
match the coresidence pattern for the 1996 cohort. Then, we compute the change in net
assets that a 24 years old college graduate would require to compensate for the decline in
welfare that would be entailed by the 2014 coresidence rate. Such a net asset transfer would
make a college graduate indifferent to the change in coresidence rate and we calculate it
separately for those with a matched job and with a mismatched job. We find that the net
asset transfer that compensates for the change in coresidence rate for college graduates with
a matched job is $2, 900 and it is $3, 500 for those with a mismatched job. These transfers
just exceed the monthly labor earnings of graduates with a mismatched jobs, implying that
from an economic standpoint the change in preferences for independence across cohorts is
quite modest.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the quantitative effect of job match quality, student debt, wage
dispersion, parental transfer, and preferences on college graduates’ coresiding behavior with
parents. We estimate a structural model which features a dynamic game between parents
and children and allows the choice of residence, using a sample of college graduates and
their parents from the 2014 SIPP panel data and 2014-2018 HRS data. We quantify the
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role of each channel by changing each of the factors from the 2014 to 1996 scenario. Our
counterfactual analysis suggests that student debt burden, wage dispersion, and house costs
can each account for more than 20% of the coresidence behavior change between the two
college graduation cohorts. Furthermore, we change all the economic factors from the 2014
to 1996 scenario. The combined labor market, assets holdings, family background, and
housing costs can jointly explain the 54% of the fraction of matched job difference and 63%
of coresidence difference between 1996 and 2014 youth cohort. We also show the evidence
that marriage formation and cultural change are other important factors that can explain
the rising in residence with parents over time.
Our findings shed light on how individual living arrangement is affected by labor market
conditions, asset holdings, family background, housing costs, as well as the taste for marriage
and coresiding with parents. In particular, the quantitative decomposition of each factor
individually and the combination of all factors has profound policy implications. The fact
that intergenerational living arrangements and financial support respond endogenously to
the realization of labor market shocks, assets holdings, as well as housing costs suggests
the possibility of substantial crowding out by public programs. Among policymakers and
researchers, there is an ongoing debate about attenuating the burden of student debt and
help college graduates overcome labor market frictions and find a better-matched job. Lots
of policy proposals might be designed to promote college graduates’ job match quality or
reduce student loan payment pressure. Since parental support through the shared residence
and monetary transfer may respond to such policies, it is important to assess the impact of
such policies on coresidence and other behavioral responses precisely when evaluating their
welfare implications.
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3.0 Delayed American Dream? Student debt, Family Formation and
Homeownership
Joint with
Prof. Stefania Albanesi, University of Pittsburgh, Economics
Prof. Rania Gihleb, University of Pittsburgh, Economics
3.1 Introduction
Among American households, student debt has increased rapidly during the past two
decades. Between 2003 and 2020, the share of student debt over the total household debt
has increased from 0.33% to 11% and has surpassed auto loans to become the second-
highest consumer debt category, second only to mortgages (New York Fed Consumer Credit
Panel/Equifax). For young households aged 18-29, the share of student debt over total
household debt is 35%, which comparable to the share of mortgages, 39% (New York Fed
Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, 2020Q3). As of 2019, more than 65% of college graduates
have borrowed funds for education, and and each college graduate carries on average $35,359
in student debt, which is a 26% increase in five years (Experian student loan report). Sub-
stantial student debt has a profound impact on household formation and homeownership.
According to the American Community Survey (Figure 9), the homeownership rate among
college graduates has experienced a large decline from 65% in the 2000s to 58% in the 2010s.
Similarly, the marriage rate among college graduates decreases from 67% in the 2000s to 59%
in the 2010s. Student loans–along with other economic factors such as income risk, housing
prices, and borrowing constraints–are critical to understanding the change in homeowner-
ship and marriage patterns among college graduates over time. This paper develops and
estimates a lifecycle model for studying the quantitative effect of student loans and other
economic factors on college graduates’ homeownership and marriage rates.
Our paper contributes to understanding the driving force underlying the change in home-
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Figure 9: College Graduates’ Homeownership and Marriage Rates
Note: Homeonwership and marriage rate for young college graduates between age 25 and 35. College
graduates are those with associate/junior college degree or above. Sources: American community Survey
(2000-2015).
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ownership and marriage rates among college graduates over time. Existing literature has
documented the importance of marital status, income and divorce risk in explaining the
decline in homeownership rate (Fischer and Khorunzhina, 2019; Fisher and Gervais, 2011;
Chang et al., 2019). We extend on prior work that studies the factors determining marriage
and homeownership by showing that student debt is crucial to accounting for the delay and
decline in marriage and homeownership over time. On the one hand, student loans have a
direct impact on home purchase by affecting household wealth accumulation (wealth effect).
On the other hand, student loans indirectly impact home purchase by affecting the avail-
ability and cost of mortgage loans (price effect). In addition, student loans can also affect
family formation by changing the insurance value of marriage.
Our paper also contributes to understanding the quantitative effect of each of the eco-
nomic factors on changes in homeownership patterns over time. Within the literature that
examines the contributing factors to homeownership decline, most of them provide descrip-
tive evidence (Elliott et al., 2013; Cooper and Wang, 2014; Houle and Berger, 2015). Among
the limited studies that examine the causal impact of student debt on homeownership, Mezza
et al. (2020) use in-state tuition rates at public 4-year colleges as an instrument for the
amount of student debt and find that a $1,000 increase in student debt decreases the home-
ownership rate by 1.8 percentage points for young college attendees. In addition, (Bleemer
et al., 2021) exploit state-cohort variation in tuition and find that the rise in tuition and
student debt contributed to a sharp decline in homeownership. In contrast to such reduced
form papers, we develop and estimate a structural model to shed light on the quantitative
effect of the separate and combined effects of student loans, income risks, housing prices,
and downpayment constraints on college graduates’ homeownership. We also endogenize
marriage and divorce decisions to control for the indirect effect of such economic factors on
homeownership through marriage (dis)formation.
This study also provides evidence of the quantitative effect of student debt and other
economic factors on marriage rate decline over time. Existing reduced form papers (Gicheva,
2012; Bozick and Estacion, 2014; Addo, 2014) find that student debt is negatively associated
with marriage, which is especially true for women. Moreover, Sieg and Wang (2018) estimate
a dynamic model to study the impact of student debt on the marriage market choices of
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young female lawyers and find that student debt has negative effects on marriage prospects.
However, their narrow sample of female lawyers may cast doubt on the external validity
of their results. In contrast, we use two national representative samples consisting of two
cohorts of male and female college graduates to study the quantitative effect of student loans,
income risk, housing prices, and downpayment constraints on marriage and divorce.
To highlight the correlation between student debt and marriage/homeownership, we
document the student loans, marriage, and homeownership patterns for the 1960 birth cohort
and 1980 birth cohort using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979 and
1997 data sets. Compared to the 1960 college cohort, the 1980 college cohort has much
higher student debt in both extensive and intensive margins. The 1980 college cohort also
has a lower homeownership rate and marriage rate before age 35. For both the 1960 and
1980 college cohorts, graduates with student loans have a significantly lower homeownership
and marriage rates than those without student loans.
We then build and estimate a life-cycle model of college graduates to understand the
mechanism through which student debt and other economic factors could affect their deci-
sions on marriage and homeownership. In the model, we begin tracking college graduates at
age 25, when they have entered the labor market with a certain level of labor productivity.
Since we are interested in the effect of student loans per se on household behavior, we do not
explicitly model student loan borrowing decisions. Instead, we assign each college graduate
a given level of student loans at age 25. Student loans are not defaultable and must be paid
off according to the standard 10-year repayment plan. The payment amount is determined
by the total student debt each college graduate has at the initial period.
In each period of the model, we consider the problem of single and married college
graduates who face several sources of shock: a permanent productivity shock, a match
quality shock of marriage as well as the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks of housing prices.
At the beginning of each period, singles may meet a potential partner, drawn from the
distribution of available singles, and decide whether to get married. The married couple
will experience love shocks to their marriage and decide whether to remain married or get
divorced given options outside of marriage. Both single and married households also decide
on female labor supply, homeownership, and how much to save or consume. The model
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features both goods consumption and housing consumption, where housing consumption is
determined by homeownership and size of housing. Homeowners can use their housing as
collateral borrowing, i.e., mortgages. Mortgages are long-term and defaultable.
We use the NLSY79 data to estimate the preference parameters regarding household de-
cisions on homeownership, marriage, employment, and mortgage default behavior. We rely
on the data variation in student loans, homeownership rate, marital status, female employ-
ment rate, and default risk for college graduates. Beyond that, we leverage comprehensive
information on Experian Credit Panels to empirically estimate the effect of student loans
on credit scores. Then we map each individual’s credit score to his/her mortgage price.
This empirical estimation allows us to capture the effect of student debt on home purchase
through the availability and price of mortgages. Besides the good fit of the model to targeted
moments, we have also illustrated that the model replicates salient features of non-targeted
moments, which show the difference in household behavior for college graduates with and
without student loans.
We finally apply the estimated model to quantify the effect of student debt, housing
price, income risk, and downpayment rate, on homeownership and marriage. We apply each
of the economic factors from the NLSY 79 cohort scenario to the NLSY 97 cohort scenario
and examine how each factor can individually account for the homeownership and marriage
difference between the two cohorts. We find that student debt per se has a substantial
impact on college graduates’ marriage and homeownership rates. In particular, student debt
can account for 33% of the overall homeownership decline and 18% of the overall marriage
decline between the NLSY 79 and NLSY 97 college cohorts. Within the student debt’s
effect on homeownership, the wealth effect has contributed to 33% of the gap, while the
price effect plays little role in closing the homeownership gap. Furthermore, housing price
increase over time can account for 45% of the overall homeownership difference but has
no significant impact on marriage difference. In addition, wage dispersion can explain 4%
of the homeownership decline and 18% of the marriage decline between the two college
cohorts. Nevertheless, we find that relaxing downpayment constraint could enlarge the gap
in marriage or homeownership between the two cohorts. Last but not least, we examine
the combined effect of all factors, as the combined factors may have a different impact
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than each individual one because of offsetting interactions. We find that combining all the
economic factors mentioned above can account for 71% of the homeownership difference
between the two college cohorts. However, the combined factors can barely explain any
marriage difference between the two cohorts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the data sets and
stylized facts. We describes the lifecycle model and discusses the college graduates’ decisions
in Section III. Section IV discusses structural parameter estimates as well as the model fit.
Section V presents the counterfactual experiments, which quantify each of the economic
factors that account for the change in homeownership and family formation over time. The
last section concludes this paper and discusses policy implications.
3.2 Data and Stylized Facts
3.2.1 Data
The main data set is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and
1997 (NLSY79 and NLSY97). The NLSY79 focuses on the youth cohort born between the
years 1957-1965 and follows the cohort between the years 1979-2016. The cohort was sur-
veyed annually before the year 1994 and biennially thereafter. We can track the sample in
NLSY79 from age 25 to 60. On the other hand, the NLSY97 focuses on the cohort born be-
tween the years 1980-1984 and follows the cohort between the years 1997-2017. This cohort
was surveyed annually before the year 2011 and biennially thereafter, which allows us to track
the sample from age 25 to 35. Both data sets contain detailed information on individual
demographics, student loans, labor market outcomes, marriage dynamics, and homeown-
ership. We focus on the sample of college graduates that have obtained Associate/Junior
College (AA) degrees or above and are not currently enrolled in school. Applying this re-
striction criteria, the NLSY79 sample includes 2,312 individuals and 48,990 year-individual
observations and the NLSY97 sample includes 8,984 individuals and 111,233 year-individual
observations. We use both data sets to provide a cluster of stylized facts about the change
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in homeownership and family formation between the two cohorts.
3.2.2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we present the stylized facts about student loans for the NLSY79 and
NLSY97 college cohorts. We also show the homeownership and marriage patterns for the two
college cohorts by student loan status. By the age of 25, Table 16 reports that the younger
cohort (NLSY97) has a much higher student loan both in the extensive and intensive margin.
In particular, the share of college people with student loans is 35% for the younger cohort,
compared to 24% for the older cohort. Moreover, conditional on the sample of graduates that
have student loans, the average amount is $19,260 for the younger cohort, almost doubled
than that for the older cohort.
Table 16: Share and Amount of Student Loans
Age 25 Share with student loans Student loan amount (Cond.)
NLSY79 0.24 $10,279
NLSY97 0.35 $19,260
Note: Fraction with debt and debt amount is calculated for those that are at age 25 and have obtained
Associate/Junior College (AA) degrees or above. The amount is in real terms taking 2010 as the base year.
Data is drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys 79 (NLSY79) and National Longitudinal Surveys 97
(NLSY97).
We then present the homeownership and marriage patterns for the two college cohorts
by student loan status. Figure 10 documents the homeownership patterns for the NLSY79
and NLSY97 college cohorts. The homeownership rate is measured by the share of college
graduates that own a home in age groups 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59.
Due to data limitations, the statistics for NLSY97 are only available until age 35. Compared
to NLSY79, the NLSY97 college cohort has a lower homeownership rate at each age groups
for both individuals with and without student loans. However, individuals with student loans
experience a large decline in homeownership (13%) than those without student loans (11%)
between the two cohorts. Figure 12 documents the marriage patterns for the two college
cohorts. The younger cohort has a lower marriage rate at each age bin for both college
graduates with and without student loans. The decrease in marriage rates for those with
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Figure 10: Homeownership Rate
Note: The homeownership rate for NLSY79 is calculated for individuals aged 25-60. Homeownership rate
from NLSY97 is only collected for individuals at age 20, 25, 30, and 35 due to data availability.Sources:
National Longitudinal Surveys 79 (NLSY79) and National Longitudinal Surveys 97 (NLSY97).
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Figure 11: Marriage Rate
Note: The marriage rate for NLSY79 is calculated for individuals aged 25-60. Marriage rate for NLSY97 is
calculated for individuals aged 25-35 due to data availability. Data is drawn from the National Longitudinal
Surveys 79 (NLSY79) and National Longitudinal Surveys 97 (NLSY97).
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student loans and those without student loans are similar (12% vs 11%). To sum up, the
stylized facts show that the younger college cohort has a much higher student loan in terms
of both share with debt and average debt amount. Moreover, the younger cohort has a much
lower homeownership and marriage rates compared to the older cohort. College graduates
with student loans experience a higher decrease in homeownership rates between the two
cohorts.
3.3 A Model Demonstrating Household Decisions
The effect of student loans on family formation is ambiguous due to the composition of
opposing channels. On the one hand, people with student loans are constrained and less
attractive in the marriage market, thus decreases the marriage rate. On the other hand,
people with student loans would like to marry because marriage can insure them against
income shocks while constrained by student loans, thus promotes the marriage rate.
The effect of student loans on homeownership is negative due to the wealth and price
effects. Homeownership requires a substantial amount of assets for the downpayment. How-
ever, student loan payments decrease household asset accumulation, which will depress home-
ownership through a wealth effect. Moreover, people with student loans are facing higher
mortgage prices, which increases the cost of homeownership and discourages homeowner-
ship through a price effect. In addition to student loans, other economic factors such as
housing prices, wage offers, and downpayment rates could also affect family formation and
homeownership decisions in nontrivial ways.
To motivate household behavior, we build a lifecycle model focusing on college gradu-
ates to highlight the mechanisms through which student loans and other economic factors
could affect household decisions on marriage and homeownership. College graduates work
in periods j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} and retire after period J . Each period in the model corresponds
to 5 years in real life. The initial period in the model corresponds to age 25 for the college
graduates, when they have left school with a certain level of student debt. College graduates
obtain utility from both goods and housing consumption, where housing consumption comes
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from renting or owning. Compared to renting, owning a house is beneficial because it yields
a higher utility flow and housing can be used as collateral for borrowing, i.e., mortgages.
Mortgages are long-term and amortized over the rest of borrowers’ lives. Mortgages are
defaultable but default will lead to foreclosure, which entails a utility cost for the household.
Owning a house also exposes households to capital gains and losses from fluctuations in
house prices.
At the beginning of each period, men (M) and women (W ) know their labor productiv-
ities. Women learn whether they have a child, as a function of their marital status and age.
We assume that college men always work but college women may not work due to disutil-
ity of working. With a certain probability, single agents (S) may meet a partner, which is
randomly drawn from the same age group of the remaining singles. Given their states and
initial match quality shock, single people and their potential partners decide whether to get
married. Married couples (M) observe the realization of a love shock to marriage at the
beginning of each period and decide whether to stay married or get divorced. In addition
to marriage, all types of households make decisions on homeownership (determines housing
consumption), saving in non-housing assets, female labor supply, and goods consumption in
each period.
3.3.1 Preference
The utility of a single (S) agent i of gender g ∈ {W,M} in period t is denoted by






− φSg(N)lit − χDit
where cit > 0 is goods consumption and hcit > 0 is housing consumption, which is defined
as
hc =
 h, if rentingωh, if owning (8)
where h ∈ [hmin, ..., hmax] is the housing size (or quality). If renting a house, housing con-
sumption is the same as the housing size, h. If owning a house, housing consumption is
ωh, where ω > 1 captures the extra utility of being homeowners. In addition, the term
lit ∈ {0, 1} stands for female labor supply decision; the term φSg(N) is the disutility from
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working, which is gender and children (N) specific. Note that men always work so the disu-
tility of working only applies to women. Households also incur a utility cost χ if they default
on mortgages Dit = 1.






− φMg(N)lMgit − χDit +Qit
where cit > 0 and hcit > 0 are joint goods and housing consumption. The parameter
γe ∈ (0.5, 1) captures the economy of scale within a household. The utility of married men
and women depends on working (or leisure) φMg(N)lMgit , default on mortgages χDit, and the
match quality Qit. Children affect a man only if he is married to a woman.
3.3.2 Risk
Households may experience labor productivity shocks that affect their earnings, match
quality shocks that affect marriage dynamics, fertility shocks that determine the number of
children, and aggregate as well idiosyncratic shocks that affect housing values.

















it ∼ N(0, σ2ζg)
where zgit is the permanent income component that evolves as a random walk following
innovation ζgit; the term ε
g
it is the measurement error, which is i.i.d and normally distributed
as N(0, σ2εg). Since some women do not work, we will take into account endogenous selection
into employment when estimating the wage profile for them.
Marriage and fertility In each period, a single agent meets with a potential spouse
(of the same age) with probability λj, who is characterized by certain labor productivity,
student loans, assets, and housing. The probability λj varies by age as the marriage pattern
is age-dependent. The potential couple then draws an initial match quality Q0 ∼ N(0, σ2Q0).
If they decide to marry, their match quality evolves as
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Qit = Qit−1 + ξQ
where ξQ ∼ N(0, σ2Q).
The probability of having children depends on women’s marital status (Mit) and age (j).
In particular, The probability of having a child is given by
Pr(Nit = 1|Nit−1 = 0;Mit, j)
Since the probability depends on marriage, fertility is partially endogenized through marital
decisions. For simplicity, we assume each woman can only have one child.
Housing and mortgages We model the aggregate house price similar to Corbae and
Quintin (2015). The aggregate house price is PHt = P
H×zt, where zt is a three-point process





Homeowners also experience an idiosyncratic house price shock, δ, in addition to the
aggregate house price PH . We assume that δ is uniformly distributed on [δ, δ], where δ <
0 and δ > 0, implying the price shock covers both depreciation and appreciation. The
idiosyncratic shock process is independent of aggregate shocks and obeys a law of large
numbers. One possible interpretation of idiosyncratic shocks is “neighborhood effects”, which
alter the market value of the house independent of aggregate housing price changes (Corbae
and Quintin, 2015). Rental rate PR is a function of housing price, determined by a price-to-
rent ratio from the Census data.1
Households can purchase homes by borrowing mortgages (m). All mortgages are long-
term and amortized over the remaining life at an interest rm(.) that depends on the agent’s
age and student loan status. At the time of origination, the initial mortgage balance m must
be less than a fraction η of the collateral value of the house being purchased:








(1 + rm)J−j − 1
m
Thus, the mortgage evolves according to
m′ = m(1 + rm)− π
Mortgages are defaultable. Once households default on mortgages, foreclosure starts. House-




At the beginning of each age of j, all shocks are realized and college graduates decide
whether to marry (or divorce). Conditional on marriage, households then make a decision
on labor supply, saving, goods, and housing consumption.
If not default on mortgages, a single household’s budget constraint is:
c+ a′ + PRh1rent = wl + a− Φ(h′, h)
where a′ = b′ + [PH
′
(1 − δ)h′ −m′]1own − d′ is total asset for next period, including saving
b′, housing asset [PH
′
(1 − δ)h′ − m′] if the household is a homeowner (1own = 1), and
student loans d′. The term PRh is rent if the household is a renter (1rent = 1). Renters
and homeowners are mutually exclusive. The term wl is labor income and a = (1 + rb)b +
[PH(1 − δ)h − (1 + rm)m]1own − (1 + rd)d is the current period total assets, in which rb is
the saving interest rate and rd is the student loan interest rate. The term Φ(h
′, h) represents





Hh, if h 6= h′
0, if h = h′
The law of motion for student loan is given by:
d′ = d(1 + rd)− dpay
where dpay is the payment per period. Assuming student loan is paid off in 10 years (by age




(1 + rd)35−j − 1
d
If defaulting on mortgages, the foreclosure starts and the budget constraint is:
c+ b′ − d′ = wl + (1 + rb)b− (1 + rd)d
The state vector for a single household is Ωit = [j, P
H , zit, hit, dit,mit, bit, Nit, Qit], which
is composed of age, aggregate housing prices, labor productivity, housing, student loans,
mortgages, non-housing assets, children and love shocks. With probability λj, at the be-
ginning of each period a single woman (man) meets a man (woman) with characteristics
[z̃it, h̃it, d̃it, m̃it, b̃it]. The potential couple then draws an initial match quality Qi0. If a match
is formed, then Mit = 1; otherwise Mit = 0.
Let V SWit (Ω
Sg





denote the value function for a married agent at time t. A single agent maximizes the
following value function s.t. the budget constraint.
V Sgit (Ω
Sg
it ) = max{c,h′,b′,m′,l,D}














When a man and a woman get married, their assets are merged and labor income is
pooled so that they solve a joint maximization problem. Each partner has equal weight
(0.5) in the joint household value. The household will jointly decide on goods consumption,
housing, savings, and female labor supplies.
The joint budget constraint of a married couple is: c+ a′ + PRh11rent = wF lF + wM + a− Φ(h′, h), if not defaultc+ b′ − d′ = wF lF + wM + (1 + rb)b− (1 + rd)d, if default
Let V Mit (Ω
M
it ) denote the joint value function of a married couple. A household aims to
maximize the following joint value function s.t the joint household budget constraint.
V Mit (Ω
M
it ) = max{c,h′,d′,l,B}
0.5(uMMit (c, s, l, B) + u
FM
it (c, s, l, B))+
βE[(1− di,t+1)V Mit+1(ΩMit+1) + di,t+1(0.5V SMit+1(ΩSMit+1) + 0.5V SWit+1(ΩSWit+1)]
where di,t+1 is the divorce decision at the beginning of next period.
Men and women will get married or remain married if and only if the value of being
married is no less than the value of being single, i.e.,
V MWit (Ω
M
it ) ≥ V SWit (ΩSWit )
V MMit (Ω
M
it ) ≥ V SMit (ΩSMit )
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3.4 Estimation
Estimation of the model is based on the NLSY79 cohort of individuals that have ob-
tained Associate/Junior College (AA) degrees or above. We estimate the model parameters
in three steps. First, we calibrate some parameters outside the model. Second, we estimate
earning parameters, fertility process, and the distribution of potential spouses directly from
the data without the model structure. Third, we estimate the remaining parameters by
solving the model. The internally estimated parameters include parameters associated with
homeownership and labor supply decisions (ω, φSW , φMW0 , φ
MW
1 ), along with parameters gov-
erning marriage dynamics (σ2Q0, σ
2
Q, λy, λm, λo). We apply the Method of Simulated Moments
(MSM) to minimize the difference between simulated moments and data moments, weighted
by the variance-covariance matrix of the data moments.
3.4.1 Initial Conditions
Before we present the estimates in detail, We first specify the initial conditions of the
model. The model considers college graduates’ decisions starting at age 25. Before age 25,
30% of men and women have been married and 20% of women have been given birth to
children. Around 7% of the sample owns a house. Therefore, the proportions of men and
women being married and the proportion of women who have a child before age 25 are set
to match the data. Since the proportion of the sample owning a house is small. We set the
initial proportion of men and women owning a house to zero.
3.4.2 Externally Calibrated Parameters
The value and reference of the externally calibrated parameters are reported in Table 26.
Agents have a constant risk aversion coefficient of γ = 1.5. The annual discount factor is
β = 0.98, which transforms into a 5-year discount factor as β = 0.9. Following Kaplan et al.
(2017), the share of goods and housing consumption in the utility function is α = 0.8 and
1−α = 0.2 . Following Eckstein et al. (2019), the economy of scale is set to be 0.7, so a couple
needs 40% more expenditure than a single person to obtain an equivalent consumption level.
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Table 17: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Value Source
σ (risk aversion) 1.5 Attanasio et al. (2008)
β (discounting rate) 0.98 Attanasio et al. (2008)
α (share of c in utility) 0.8 Kaplan et al. (2017)
γe (economic of scale) 0.7 Eckstein et al. (2019)
rd (student loan interest rate) 6% Stafford student loan interest rate
η (downpayment) 20% Freddie Mac LTV for prime mortgages
(δ, δ) (price shocks) (-0.25, 0.15) Chang et al. (2019)
(κb, κs) (transition cost) (0.025, 0.07) Yang (2009)
(h1, h2) (housing size) (2,3) Zillow
rb (saving interest rate) 0.03 Federal Reserve interest rate
Student loan interest rate is set as the average of the historical Stafford student loan interest
rate between 1992 and 2006, which is 6%.2 The downpayment constraint is 20%, as indicated
by the Freddie Mac Loan to Value ratio for prime mortgages. The bounds for idiosyncratic
housing price shocks are drawn from Chang et al. (2019). For transaction costs of housing,
I follow Yang (2009) to set 2.5% of home value for buying and 7% of home value for selling.
The housing size is calibrated from Zillow and the risk-free saving interest rate is 3%.
3.4.3 Externally Estimated Parameters
When estimating females’ wage profile, selection into employment is a concern because
wages are not observed for women who do not work and decisions to work depend on wage
offers. We apply a two-step Heckman selection correction procedure to account for the
selection problem. In particular, we follow Voena (2015) to exploit variation in divorce laws
across states and over time as instruments that affect women’s decision to work but that
are otherwise excluded from the wage equation. Since We also control for time and state
fixed effect, the instruments capture differential changes in policy over time and states. The
identification assumption is that the divorce laws affect women’s wages only through their
impact on employment. The first stage showing the effect of divorce laws on employment
2https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/historical-federal-student-interest-rates-and-fees
99
for women is in Table 39.
We then apply a variance-covariance decomposition framework with selection correction
to estimate the variance of productivity shock and variance of measurement error. Since men
always work, the selection correction only applies to women. We report wage parameters
in Table 28. The variances of permanent income shocks for males and females are 0.09 and
0.075. The variances of measurement errors for both men and women are 0.05.
Table 18: Parameters Estimated Outside The Model
Parameters Description Value
Men
β0M Constant in earnings profile 8.17
β1M Coefficient for age 0.121
β2M Coefficient for age square -0.001
σ2ζM Variance of productivity shock 0.03
σ2εM Variance of measurement error 0.14
Women
β0F Constant in earnings profile 8.96
β1F Coefficient for age 0.069
β2F Coefficient for age square -0.0007
σ2ζF Variance of productivity shock 0.02
σ2εF Variance of measurement error 0.12
We compute the Markov process for fertility by examining transition probabilities as a
function of a woman’s age and marital status using NLSY79 data. The estimated transition
probabilities are presented in Figure 25. The distribution of characteristics of single men
and women comes from the age-dependent distribution of characteristics for singles in the
data. College graduates will form expectations about the marriage matches they may be
involved in based on the distribution of remaining singles.
3.4.4 Internally Estimated Parameters
We estimate the remaining parameters using Method of Simulated Moments (MSM)
(McFadden, 1989). We choose the parameters to minimize the distance between the data
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moments and the simulated moments generated from the model.
min{Θ}(φdata − φsim)′W (φ̂data − φsim)
The vector Θ contains the remaining unknown parameters: the extra utility from being
homeowners (ω); the variance of initial match quality (σ2Q0) and the variance of shocks to
existing marriage (σ2Q); the probability of meeting someone at young, middle, and old age
(p1, p2, p3); the disutility from working for single women (φ
SW ), for married women without
children (φMW0 ) and married women with children (φ
MW
1 ), as well as the utility cost for
default.
Empirical moments φdata are calculated from the NLSY79 college cohort between age 25
to 60. I group the sample into 5-year bin age groups, which are 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-
49, 50-54, and 55-59. I consider marital status, fertility, homeownership, and employment in
the corresponding age bins. Simulated moments φsim are computed using the full numerical
solution of the model.
3.4.5 Identification
All the moments are jointly used to estimate all parameters. However, certain moments
are particularly important to identify certain parameters. we provide a heuristic argument
that how each of the parameters can be identified from a subset of the moments. The first set
of moments include conditional moments for labor supply, i.e., fractions of women employed
by marital and fertility status. These moments pin down the disutility of work for women.
The second set of moments are the average homeownership rate and foreclosure rate, which
pin down the extra utility from being homeowners and the cost of default. The third set of
moments include marriage rate by age, divorce rate by age, and share of being ever married
by age. These moments contribute to pinning down the variance of marriage shocks and the
probability of meeting a partner.
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Table 19: Model Fit
Moments Data Model
Homeownership rate 0.63 0.64
Employment for single women 0.81 0.83
Employment for married women w/ children 0.72 0.72
Employment for married women w/o children 0.85 0.85
Default rate 0.005 0.007
Figure 12: Marriage and Divorce By Age
Note: The blue lines are the marriage and divorce rate by age calculated from NLSY79 data. The red lines
are the marriage and divorce rate by age simulated from the model.
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Figure 13: Homeownership By Student Loans
Note: The blue solid lines are the homeownership rates for graduates with student debt for the model and
for the data. The red dotted lines are the homeownership rates for graduates without student debt for the
model and for the data.
Figure 14: Marriage By Student Loans
Note: The blue solid lines are the marriage rates for graduates with student debt for the model and for the
data. The red dotted lines are the marriage rates for graduates without student debt for the model and for
the data.
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3.4.6 Model Fit and Estimated Parameters
The model fit for homeownership, employment, and the default rate is shown in Table
19. The model fit for marriage and divorce rate by age is shown in Figure 12.3 The model
can replicate the targeted moments very well. In addition, the model can also reproduce
statistics that were not targeted by the estimation procedure. An important set of nontar-
geted statistics are marriage and homeownership rates conditional on student loan status.
Figure 13 and 14 show that the model can replicate the homeownership and marriage rate
of the people with and without student loans.
Table 31 reports internally estimated parameters. The parameter governing the extra
utility of being homeowners is estimated to be 1.01, implying that homeownership yields
a higher utility flow. The variances of shocks to the initial marriage match and shocks to
existing marriages are estimated to be 0.01 and 0.016. The probabilities of meeting someone
at a young age, (25-35), middle-age (35-45), and old age (45+) are 0.55, 0.16, and 0.07. The
disutility of working parameters helps match the employment patterns for single women and
married women with or without children. The cost of default is estimated to be 0.01.
Table 20: Parameters Estimated Within The Model
Parameters Description Value
ω extra utility from homeownership 1.01
σ2Q0, σ
2
Q variance of marriage shock 0.01, 0.02
p1, p2, p3 probability of meeting someone 0.6, 0.24, 0.1
φSW disutility of working for single female 0.18
φMW 0 disutility of working for married female w/o children 0.08
φMW 1 disutility of working for married female w/ children 0.09
χ cost of default 0.01
3The fraction of ever married by age is shown in Figure 19.
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3.5 Understanding Changes in Homeownership and Marriage Over Time
The most important use of the model and structural estimates is to quantify the effect of
each economic factor on marriage and homeownership changes between the two cohorts. We
consider changes in student loans, housing prices, wage volatility, and downpayment. The
goal of this section is to first quantify the explanatory power of each channel while controlling
for other changes that affect marriage and housing decisions. We then examine the impact
of the combination of changing the entire economic factors on marriage and homeownership.
21 presents the homeownership and marriage rates for NLSY 79 and NLSY 97 cohorts
between age 25-35. Consistent with earlier stylized facts, both homeownership and marriage
rates are much lower for the younger cohort. In particular, the homeownership rate for the
younger cohort is 7 percentage points lower or 17% lower relative to that for the older cohort.
The marriage rate is 5 percentage points or 9% lower when comparing the younger cohort
to the older cohort.
Table 21: Difference Between NLSY79 And NLSY97
Moments (age 25-35) NLSY 79 NLSY97 Difference (%)
Homeownership rate 0.49 0.42 17%
Marriage rate 0.57 0.52 9%
3.5.1 Student Loans
Wealth effect Student loans significantly affect marriage and homeownership. The
fraction of college graduates with student debt and the average amount of debt starts to
rocket after 2000. This is mostly due to the tuition and costs associated with the college
is increasing (Lucca et al., 2018). The younger cohort thus has a much higher share and
amount of student loans than the older cohort (Table 16), which will affect marriage and
homeownership through an income effect.
Price effect The two college cohorts also face very different mortgage interest rates.
Figure 15 shows the nominal and inflation-adjusted mortgage interest rates in the past
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50 years. Starting with a low level in the 1970s, the mortgage interest rate reaches the
historically high level in the 1980s and then steadily goes down over time. The older college
cohort mostly buys their houses in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the younger cohort
starts buying homes after the year 2010. Thus, giving all else being equal, the younger cohort
faces a lower average mortgage interest, which will promote homeownership of the younger
cohort relative to the older cohort.
However, it is important to mention that college graduates with student loans may have
relatively lower credit scores and thereby facing a higher mortgage interest rate. More
importantly, college graduates who default on student loans will subject to a larger penalty
on credit scores and subsequently impact their mortgage interest rates. Since the younger
cohort has much higher student loans and default rates on student loans, they may subject
to a higher mortgage interest rate than the older cohort. The impact of student loans
and default rates on mortgage interests is an empirical question. In Appendix X [notes
from Stefania], we apply the credit file data from the Experian credit bureau to empirically
estimate the impact of student loans, default risks, and age on credit scores and the mapping
the credit scores into the mortgage interest rates.
Based on the empirical estimates, Table 22 reports the mortgage interest rate for the
younger cohort and older cohort by student loan status.
The age of first-time homebuyers is between 30-35 for both younger and older cohorts.
Older cohort college graduates tend to buy their first homes between the years 1990-1995
and younger cohort college graduates tend to buy their first homes between years 2010-
2015. We calculate the average of real mortgage interest rates in the prime and sub-prime
categories between years 1990-1995 for the older cohort and years 2010-2015 for the younger
cohort. The NLSY79 college cohort with student loans has a mortgage interest of 0.055
throughout their lives, which is the sub-prime mortgage interest rate. The NLSY79 college
cohort without student loans has sub-prime mortgage interest of 0.055 before age 40 and
a prime mortgage interest rate of 0.052 after age 40. The decrease in mortgage interest
rate is a result of the increase in credit scores as people become older. In contrast, the
NLSY97 college cohort is not allowed to borrow mortgages before age 30 because of more
student loans and higher student loan default risk. Though not everyone with a student loan
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Figure 15: 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage Interest Rates (%)
Note: Freddie Mac 30-Year fixed rate mortgage interest rate (1970-2020).
Table 22: Mortgage Interest Rates
Age NLSY 1979 NLSY 1997
w/ student loans w/o student loans w/ student loans w/o student loans
25-29 0.055 0.055 N.A. 0.031
30-34 0.055 0.055 0.031 0.031
35-39 0.055 0.055 0.031 0.031
40-44 0.055 0.052 0.031 0.029
45-49 0.055 0.052 0.031 0.029
50-54 0.055 0.052 0.031 0.029
55-59 0.055 0.052 0.031 0.029
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defaults on it, the default penalty on student loans tends to apply to every college graduate
with student loans, which render them impossible to borrow a mortgage at an early age.
As college graduates paying off their student loans after age 30, they are allowed to borrow
mortgages and have mortgage interest of 0.031 throughout the rest of their lives, which is
the sub-prime mortgage interest rate for the younger cohort. The NLSY97 college cohort
without student loans has sub-prime mortgage interest of 0.031 before age 40 and a prime
mortgage interest rate of 0.029 after age 40. The decrease in mortgage interest rate is a
result of the increase in credit scores as people become older.
We report the effect of student debt on homeownership and marriage difference between
the two cohorts in Figure 16 and Figure 17. Student debt can account for 33% of the
homeownership difference and 17% of marriage difference between the two cohorts. Within
the effect on homeownership, wealth effect accounts for 33% of the homeownership difference,
while price effect does not account for much of the difference.
3.5.2 Housing Prices
The level of housing prices is important for understanding the changes in homeownership.
Older cohort college graduates tend to buy their first homes between the years 1990-1995
and younger cohort college graduates tend to buy their first homes between years 2010-2015.
Real house prices were higher in the 2010 decade compared to the 1990 decade. According
to the Case Shiller Home Price, real housing price is 13% higher in the period 2010-2015
compared to period 1990-1995. The impact of rising housing prices on homeownership is
ambiguous as rental prices are also rising along with housing prices. Thus, the costs for
both renting and buying a house increase. The effect of price increase on homeownership
will thus depend on household preferences for homeownership, household budgets, and the
price-to-rent ratio.
3.5.3 Mean Wage and Wage Volatility
The increase in labor market volatility over time is widely documented in previous lit-
erature (Moffitt and Zhang, 2018; Santos and Weiss, 2016). College graduates are not an
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exception. Table 28 shows that the mean earnings of college men for the younger cohort are
similar to that for the older cohort. The mean earnings of college women for the younger
cohort are higher than that for the older cohort. However, compared to the older cohort,
the younger cohort has a larger standard deviation of earnings for both men and women,
implying a higher income risk for the younger cohort.
Table 23: Mean And SD Of Wage
Age 25-35 Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD
NLSY79 52,398 29,919 38,249 21,242
NLSY97 51,357 33,567 41,998 25,092
The effect of increasing income volatility on homeownership is two folds. On the one
hand, rising income risk cause households to delay homeownership. This is because higher-
income risk will slow household asset accumulation and affect their ability to maintain long-
term mortgage payments. On the other hand, an increase in income risk could also promote
household precautionary saving. Ceteris paribus, higher wealth due to precautionary saving
will increase homeownership.
3.5.4 Downpayment
The downpayment constraint is one of the major constraints for households to buy a
house. The downpayment constraint for the older cohort is 20%. If the average inflation-
adjusted home price in the 1990s is $180,000 (The National Association of Realtors, The
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Robert Shiller, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics),
then the average downpayment for a homeowner is $36,000, which is the average annual
wage of a college graduate at ages 27. With a looser downpayment constraint, households
can buy a house with fewer assets. Data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) shows
that the average downpayment after 2009 is 0.15, 25% lower than the downpayment applied
to the older cohort. With a downpayment rate at 15% and all else being equal, the average
downpayment for a home purchase is $27,000.
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Figure 16: Role of Student Debt, Housing Price, and Wage Dispersion
Note: The overall gap between the two cohorts are based on the calculation from NLSY 79 and NLSY97.
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Figure 17: Role of Student Debt, Housing Price, and Wage Dispersion
Note: The overall gap between the two cohorts are based on the calculation from NLSY 79 and NLSY97.
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We report the effect of housing price, wage dispersion, and downpayment rates on home-
ownership and marriage difference between the two cohorts in Figure 16 and Figure 17.
Among all of them, housing price and wage dispersion can account for 45% and 4% of the
homeownership difference across the two college cohorts. In addition, wage dispersion can
explain 19% of the marriage difference between the two cohorts. The downpayment rate,
however, enlarges the gap of marriage and homeownership rates between the two cohorts.
3.5.5 Combining All the Economic Factors
We finally examine the combined effects of all the channels explored individually above.
The combined channels may have a different impact than each individual channel because
of offsetting interactions. The results from this combined experiment are shown in Table
24. The combined factors can explain 53% of the homeownership decline and 22% of the
marriage rate decline between the two cohorts.
Table 24: Difference Between NLSY79 And NLSY97
Moments (age 25-35) Difference (%) Combined channels Explanatory share
Homeownership rate 17% 9% 53%
Marriage rate 9% 2% 22%
3.6 Conclusion
This paper first documents the increase in student debt and decline in homeownership
and marriage rates for college graduates over time. We then study the effect of student debt
on marriage and homeownership among college graduates. Using NLSY 79 and NLSY 97
data, we develop and estimate a lifecycle model to quantify the role of student debt in college
graduates’ marriage and homeownership patterns. We find that the increase in student debt
over time can account for 46% of the difference in homeownership rates and 17% of the
difference in marriage rates between NLSY 79 and NLSY 97 college cohorts. Student debt
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negatively affect home purchase by reducing household asset accumulation (wealth effect)
and by increasing the mortgage prices (price effect), where the wealth and price effects can
each account for 30% and 16% of the homeownership difference, respectively. Beyond student
debt, we also examine the role of housing prices, wage dispersion, and downpayment rates
in accounting for the difference in homeownership and marriage rates. We find that housing
price increase over time can account for 17% of the overall homeownership difference, and
wage dispersion can explain 30% of the homeownership decline and 18% of the marriage
decline when comparing the two cohorts.
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Appendix A First Chapter
Figure 18: Probability of Having the First Child by Woman’s Age and Marital Status
Note: Data is drawn from the SIPP 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2014 panels.
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Figure 19: Fraction Ever Married by Age (Percentage)
Note: The blue line is the share ever married by age calculated from the SIPP data. The red line is the
share ever married by age simulated from the model. The dotted lines are the 95% confidence internal of
fraction ever married.
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Table 25: The Effect of Housing Vouchers: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Employed Homeowner Married Divorced
Housing Vouchers -0.123*** -0.294*** -0.225*** 0.043***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Individual fixed effect No No No No
Mean of Dep. Var 0.46 0.33 0.39 0.19
Observations 146,480 146,480 146,480 146,480
Note: Data is drawn from the SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2014 Panel). All estimates control for
gender, race, disability, age, education fixed effect, state fixed effect, year fixed effect and state specific time
trend. Eligibility is inferred from state median income and metro status. Standard errors are clustered at
state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
Table 26: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source
σ risk aversion 1.5 Attanasio et al. (2008)
β discounting factor 0.98 Attanasio et al. (2008)
α share of c in utility 0.8 Kaplan et al. (2017)
γe economy of scale 0.7 Eckstein et al. (2019)
η downpayment 20% Freddie Mac LTV
(κb, κs) transition cost (0.025,0.07) Yang (2009)
(rL, rH) interest rate (0.02,0.07) Net interest margin of banks (FRED)
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Table 27: The Effect of Welfare Benefits on Employment for Men and Women
Men Women
Variables Employment Employment
Simulated Food Stamp Benefits ($100) 0.002 -0.023***
(0.009) (0.005)
Simulated TANF Benefits ($100) -0.007
(0.007)
Simulated EITC Benefits ($100) 0.098*** 0.04***
(0.021) (0.013)





Note: Data is drawn from the SIPP (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2014 Panel). All estimates control for age,
state, and year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
Table 28: Parameters Estimated Outside the Model
Parameters Description Value SE
β0M life cycle profile of male earnings 8.73 2.13
β1M life cycle profile of male earnings 0.048 0.02
β2M life cycle profile of male earnings -0.001 0
σ2ζM variance of male productivity shock 0.09 0.01
σ2εM variance of male measurement error 0.11 0.02
β0F life cycle profile of female earnings 8.66 2.11
β1F life cycle profile of female earnings 0.04 0.02
β2F life cycle profile of female earnings -0.001 0
σ2ζF variance of female productivity shock 0.08 0.02
σ2εF varaince of female measurement error 0.06 0.01
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Table 29: Moments Conditional on Voucher Users and Gender (Percentage)
Model Data 95% CI
Moments of voucher users
Single male employment rate 14 17 (12, 24)
Married male employment rate 33 56 (46, 66)
Single female employment rate 35 41 (36, 52)
Married female employment rate 17 23 (18, 29)
Marriage rate 15 15 (13, 17)
Divorce rate 16 18 (16, 20)
Moments by gender
Male homeownership 29 33 (31,35)
Female homeownership 26 24 (22, 26)
Male application rate 9 10 (8, 12)
Female application rate 22 20 (18, 22)
Table 30: The Effect of Housing Vouchers from Model Simulated Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Employed Homeowner Married Divorced
Housing vouchers -0.034*** -0.045*** -0.162*** 0.159***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.006)
Mean of Dep. Var 0.54 0.28 0.4 0.1
Observations 28,000 28,000 28,000 28,000
Number of Individuals 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
Note: Data is drawn from the model simulated data. The model simulated 2000 female and 1000 males
born between 1968-1978. All estimates control for age, year and individual fixed effect. Standard errors are
clustered at individual level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 31: Parameters Estimated Within the Model
Parameters Description Value SE
ω extra utility from being home owners 1.01 0.2
σ2Q0 variance of initial match quality 0.09 0.01
σ2Q variance of existing match quality 0.14 0.03
λy, λm prob. of meeting at young age 0.41 0.08
λy, λm prob. of meeting at middle age 0.55 0.09
φSM disutility of working for single men 0.28 0.07
φMM disutility of working for married men 0.20 0.04
φSW disutility of working for single women 0.08 0.02
φMW0 disutility of working for single women w/ children 0.09 0.02
φMW1 disutility of working for single women w/o children 0.19 0.06
ν stigma cost of program participation 0.044 0.02
ξ prob. of losing housing vouchers 0.22 0.04
γ(.) conditional Prob. of receiving vouchers
γlm, γhm high-/low-income male 0.18, 0.2 0.07, 0.06
γlwc, γhwc high-/low-income female w/ children 0.35, 0.45 0.11, 0.13
γlwnc, γhwnc high-/low-income female w/o children 0.2, 0.2 0.06, 0.06
Note: I follow Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) to calculate the asymptomatic standard errors.
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Table 32: The Effect of Housing Vouchers on Prices
Rental price
Panel A: Introducing housing vouchers
No housing voucher: 1
Introducing housing voucher program:
Inelastic housing supply (0.76) : 1.05
Elastic housing supply (1.5) : 1.02
More elastic housing supply (2.3) : 1
Panel B: Policies and supply elasticity 1.5
Baseline: 1
Experiment 1: flat subsidies 1.01
Experiment 2: lower subsidy to all 1.02
Experiment 3: time limits 1
Experiment 4: home buying option 1
Note: Elasticity of housing supply is drawn from Saiz (2010). The calculation is based on the model
predictions from Zhang (2020).
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Table 33: More Experiments (Percentage)
Variables baseline low-productivity females cash assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment
single male 58 59 60 57
married male 76 76 77 75
single female 53 53 52 52
married female w/o children 45 45 45 45
married female w/ children 36 36 35 35
Household formation
marriage 40 40 40 40
divorce 9 9 9 9
homeownership 27 27 27 25
Program participation
overall 18 12 18 31
Table 34: Percent Change in Welfare
Compensation Variation All Women Men
Only to low-productivity households +1.1 +0.8 +1.4
Only to female-headed households +0.1 +1 -0.8
Cash assistance +0.45 +0.38 +0.52
Note: The welfare in the current program (baseline) is normalized to 1.
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Table 35: Parameters Estimated When Introducing Moving Costs
Parameters Description Value SE
mc moving costs $3100 $950
ω extra utility from being home owners 1.01 0.2
σ2Q0 variance of initial match quality 0.09 0.01
σ2Q variance of existing match quality 0.14 0.03
λy, λm prob. of meeting at young age 0.41 0.08
λy, λm prob. of meeting at middle age 0.55 0.09
φSM disutility of working for single men 0.28 0.07
φMM disutility of working for married men 0.20 0.04
φSW disutility of working for single women 0.08 0.02
φMW0 disutility of working for single women w/ children 0.09 0.02
φMW1 disutility of working for single women w/o children 0.19 0.06
ν stigma cost of program participation 0.026 0.01
ξ prob. of losing housing vouchers 0.22 0.04
γ(.) conditional Prob. of receiving vouchers
γlm, γhm high-/low-income male 0.18, 0.2 0.07, 0.06
γlwc, γhwc high-/low-income female w/ children 0.35, 0.45 0.11, 0.13
γlwnc, γhwnc high-/low-income female w/o children 0.2, 0.2 0.06, 0.06
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Table 36: Policy Experiments When Introducing Moving Costs (Percentage)
Variables baseline flat assistance lower to all time limits home buying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment
single male 59 61 42 54 59
married male 77 77 76 77 76
single female 54 56 50 52 54
married female w/o kids 46 46 45 46 46
married female w/ kids 36 35 36 36 36
Household formation
marriage 40 40 37 39 42
divorce 9 10 8 9 8
homeownership 28 28 22 27 34
Program participation
overall 17 30 41 19 18
low-productivity 25 39 54 25 27
high-productivity 9 21 28 13 11
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Appendix B Second Chapter
Figure 20: College Graduates Student Debt
Note: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, and 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004,
2008, 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Studies. The fraction is the percentage of undergraduates
borrowing form both subsidized and unsubsidized from Stafford program. The average amount is the average
conditional on those who are borrowing.
In this section, we discuss the construction of the main variables and several model
choices.
B.1 Coresidence Variables
Information about living arrangements in SIPP can be attained in the following ways.
Parents and the child are supposed to live together if the child’s relation to the reference
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Figure 21: College Graduates Job Mismatch Rate
Note: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, March Supplement. Young college
graduates are those aged 21 to 28 with a bachelor’s degree or higher. All figures exclude those currently
enrolled in school. Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
125
Figure 22: College Graduates Coresidence Rate
Note: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, March Supplement. Young college
graduates are those aged 21 to 28 with a bachelor’s degree or higher. All figures exclude those currently
enrolled in school. Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
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Figure 23: Coresidence of College and Non-college
Note: Survey of Income and Program Participation (1996 and 2014) and Department of Labor, O*NET
Education, Experience, Training. Note: Young college graduates are those aged 23 to 27 with a bachelor’s
degree. All figures exclude those currently enrolled in school.
person (household head) is ”son” or ”daughter” and there exists father’s person number
(EPNDAD) and/or mother’s person (EPNMOM) number. If the parents don’t live in the
household, the father’s person number and the mother’s person number will be 9999. This
information is recorded in the core microdata file for all months and all waves. We use this
information to construct coresidence with parents variables.
B.2 Labor Market Variables
The SIPP Panel data includes detailed information about an individual’s monthly la-
bor market outcomes, i.e. employment status, wage and salary, and occupation for each
job. Most of the employed college graduates (90%) has only one job. If the individual re-
ports more than one job, we take the first one as his main job. We classified the college
graduates’ job as matched or mismatched job based on the occupation they work in. For
unemployed individuals, the data set also includes the information on whether the person
claims unemployment benefits and the amount of unemployment benefits.
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Figure 24: College Graduates Wage Rate by Job Type
Note: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, March Supplement; U.S. Department of
Labor, O*NET. Young college graduates are those aged 21 to 28 with a bachelor’s degree or higher. All
figures exclude those currently enrolled in school. Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions by
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Table 37: Sample Selection
N. of observations N. of individuals
SIPP 2014 and 2018 sample 2,923,967 144,342
keep youth born between 1990-1993 150,722 8,355
keep sample with a bachelor degree 32,217 2,452





Prob not working conditional on working in last period 0.04
Prob working in MA job conditional on unemployment in last period 0.52
Prob working in MI job conditional on unemployment in last period 0.43
Fraction of getting matched job 0.48
Mean MI log entry earnings 7.4
Variance MI log entry earnings 0.52
Variance MI log earnings conditional on working in consecutive periods 0.05
Growth mean MI log earnings 0.068
Mean MA log entry earnings 7.56
Variance MA log entry earnings 0.5
Variance MA log earnings conditional on working in consecutive periods 0.045
Growth mean MA log earnings 0.078
Average unemployment rate 0.12
Coresidence:
Fraction living away 0.69
Growth fraction living away 0.05
Fraction ever move back 0.06
Autocorrelation of living away 0.87
Mean back home duration 4
Away home log earning difference 0.14
Assets and Transfers:
Mean transfer $6,058
Mean net assets -$7,299
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Matched vs mismatched job To determine whether college graduates get a mis-
matched job, we use the data from the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Information
Network (O*NET). O*NET has detailed descriptions of the work by job seekers, workforce
development and HR professionals, students, researchers. It describes the features and char-
acteristics of each occupation. We use the following question from the O*NET Education
and Training Questionnaire to determine whether an occupation requires a college degree:
“If someone were being hired to perform this job, indicate the level of education that would
be required.” We consider a college education to be a requirement for a given occupation if
at least 50 percent of the respondents working in that occupation indicated that a bache-
lor’s degree is necessary to perform the job. We then merged these data on the educational
requirements for each occupation with the SIPP data.
Unemployment benefits The unemployment benefits are calculated based on the SIPP
data for college graduates. The 2014 SIPP Panel surveys the amount of unemployment
benefits for unemployed college graduates. The average amount of unemployment benefits
for unemployed college graduates is around $600 per month during the years 2013 and 2017.
The calculation of this number includes zeros because there are observations that receive no
unemployment benefits when not working. This could be because unemployment benefits
are time-limited. If I restrict the sample to nonzero unemployment benefits, the average
unemployment benefits are $1,160 per month.
B.3 Parental Income and Transfers Variables
As the problem with most household survey data, we can only observe the characteristics
of the parents if the parents live in the same household with the children at some time in
the sample period. If the children always live independently in our sample period, we won’t
be able to know their parents’ information. Due to this data limitation, we turn to the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 1996-2000 and 2014-2018 Panel data to obtain parental
income and transfer data. The University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
is a longitudinal panel study that surveys a representative sample of approximately 20,000
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elder people in America. The data set tracks the same sample every two years. It contains
detailed information on an individual’s income and transfer amount to own children. We
apply the same sample restriction criteria with the SIPP data to the HRS data. We restrict
the sample that their children must be college graduates and must be between age 23-27.
The parents with young college graduates children are around 47-60 years old, most of which
are still working. We get the parental income data from Section J EMPLOYMENT of HRS.
It contains wage, salary, and self-employed income. We estimated the parental income as
a four-point uniform distribution. Since in the data, the parental income doesn’t change
much during 2014-2018, we take the parental income as constant in the model. The transfer
from parents to children is from Section E FAMILY STRUCTURE (CHILDREN) AND
TRANSFERS (To Child) of HRS data. The survey question is stated as follows:
“About how much did that amount to for [ that child/ [her /his /your ] deceased child/,
[her /his /your ] deceased child/ each child/ each grandchild/ each child and grandchild/
[WHICH CHILDREN GAVE LGST AMT - SPECIFY]/[WHICH CHILD GIVEN LARGEST
AMT - SPECIFY]/[WHICH CHILDREN GAVE SAME AMOUNT- [[since [Previous Wave
Month], [PREV WAVE IW YEAR OF FAMILY R]/since [PREV WAVE IW YEAR OF
FAMILY R]/in the last two years]] )?”
Since the transfer data is surveyed for the past two years, we take the average to make
it corresponds to per year. In other words, we only have annual transfer data.
B.4 Share of Public Consumption in Utility φ
The share of public consumption, φ, is from Kaplan (2012). Kaplan (2012) calibrates this
parameter from household-equivalence scales, where he considers three scales: the OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) equivalence scale, the OECD
modified scale, and the square-root scale. For each equivalence scale, He computes the
percentage increase in income needed by a household to keep welfare constant when moving
from a household with two adults to a household with three adults. These three scales give
values of 41%, 33%, and 22%, respectively. Kaplan (2012) applies a static version of his
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model to map these values into the parameter φ, which implies values for φ ranging from 0.2
to 0.42. We took the average of this range, which is 0.3. We also experimented with other
numbers like 2.5 or 3.5. The results are pretty robust.
B.5 Moving Cost κ
We calculate this number based on the following information.
a) The average moving cost from this website: https://www.moving.com/movers/moving-
cost-calculator.asp. It measures the cost of hiring professionals for local and distanced mov-
ing. It says “The average cost of a local move is $1,250. The average cost of a distanced
move is $4,890 (distance of 1,000 miles or more). These estimates are based on a 2-3 bed-
rooms move of approximately 7,500 pounds.” We played with the calculator and found the
estimates for 1 bedroom is about half of that price, which is $650 for local and $2400 for
long distance.
b) We also refer to U-haul website to calculate the moving cost for a 1 2 bedroom. It
ranges from $150 to $300 for a 200-500 miles move and $1,000 for more than 1,000 miles
move.
Given that a lot of people don’t hire professionals/trucks for moving, where the cost is
much lower, we set the moving cost as half a month rent in the model.
B.6 Tax Function
We use a tax function that includes three types of tax: payroll, federal and state. There
are two parts in payroll. First, social security tax of 6.2% of annual income up to $102,000.
Second, a medicare levy of 1.5% of annual income with no limit. In terms of federal income
tax, we calculate net income by gross income less a standard deduction of $6,200 and a
personal exemption of $3,950. We then use the progressive tax rates for a single with no
dependents for 2014 on the basis of the net income. We assume that state income taxes are
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2.5% of gross income minus a deduction for federal taxes plus another $2,500. All calculation
are based on annual income, by multiplying the monthly income by 12 and dividing the
resulting tax by 12.
B.7 Numerical Methods
The model is solved by backward induction from the terminal value functions that are
described in the main text. The asset choice is discretized into a 16 points exponentially
spaced grids between the natural borrowing limit and the maximum asset. Similarly, the
number of grid for wage offer is 10 and the number of grid for public consumption is 7. The
distribution of the preference shocks, zit is discretized into a 10 point stationary Markov
chain using Tauchen method with parameters ρz and σ
2
z . Value functions and decisions are
calculated based on the grids mentioned above. Values between grid points are calculate
based on linear interpolation. The discrete choices like coresidence and labor supply are
solved by interpolating the choice specific value function at the relevant stage of the game.
The estimation method is the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM), as proposed by
McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). The method involves finding the parameter
vector Θ that minimizes the distance between the actual data and data simulated from our
model. Let dr denote a statistic from the actual data, and let d
s
r(Θ) be the corresponding
statistic calculated in the simulated data, and assume we fit the model to r = 1, 2, ..., R
statistics. We then construct moments of the form:
msr(Θ) = [dr − dsr(Θ)] for r = [1, 2, ..., R]
The vector of simulated moments is given by g′(Θ) = [ms1(s), ...,m
s
R(s)]. We minimize the
objective function G(Θ) = g′(Θ)Wg(Θ), where the weighting matrix W is a diagonal matrix
consisting of the inverse of the estimated variance of each moment (from a first step). We
minimize G(Θ) with respect to Θ using the Simplex algorithm. We conduct our computation
using H2P Cluster from Center for Research Computing, University of Pittsburgh.
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To calculate standard errors, we follow Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011) to construct the
asymptomatic standard error. To compute the numerical standard errors, we must first
compute the numerical derivative of the objective function with respect to each of the pa-
rameter, Θp, use the five-point stencil formula with a long baseline.
fΘp =
−f(Θp + 2εp) + f(Θp + εp)− 8f(Θp − 8εp) + f(Θp − 2εp)
12εp
where f is a vector of the squared moments divided by their weights: [dr − dsr(Θ)]2/Wr and
εp is equal to 0.01Θp. Given the numerical derivatives, we compute the covariance matrix
using the outer product approximation to the Hessian.
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Appendix C Third Chapter
Table 39: The Effect of Divorce Law on Female Employment
(1) (2)
Variables Employment Employment
Equitable distribution 0.093*** 0.033
(0.018) (0.025)
Community property 0.019 -0.134***
(0.018) (0.028)
Unilateral × equitable distribution -0.04*** -0.11***
(0.014) (0.012)
Unilateral × community property 0.03 -0.38***
(0.027) (0.009)





Note: Data is drawn from NLSY79. The control variables include age fixed effect, state fixed effect, and
year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at state level. “Equitable distribution” is the introduction of
equitable distribution in mutual consent regimes. “Community property” is community property in mutual
consent regimes. “Unilateral × equitable distribution” is introducing equitable distribution in unilateral
divorce regimes. “Unilateral × community property” is the is introducing unilateral divorce in community
property regimes. “Unilateral × title-based” is the introducing unilateral divorce in a title-based system.
The excluded category is a title-based mutual consent system. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Figure 25: Probability of Having the First Child by Woman’s Age and Marital Status
Note: Data is drawn from the NLSY79. The blue solid line shows the probability of a married female giving
birth to a child at each age period and the red dash line shows the probability of a single female giving birth
to a child at each age period.
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